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I.

INTRODUCTION

Those involved in peace negotiations often face the dilemma of
balancing demands for justice with the imperative of stopping the conflict
as quickly as possible. There are abiding ethical and moral debates
surrounding this tension between peace and justice. In Syria—where the
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death toll has exceeded 470,000, 11 million have been displaced, and there
are over 14,000 documented cases of death by torture1—the peace versus
justice puzzle is a living dilemma with which those involved in the peace
process grapple with on a daily basis.
Is it morally permissible to allow conflict (and the attendant human
suffering) to continue, so as to advance the possibility of achieving justice
in the form of accountability against the perpetrators of the violence?
Alternatively, if justice is set aside to achieve peace more rapidly, and
accountability is delayed or even prevented, is the resulting harm (including
a possible return to conflict) acceptable? The debate between peace and
justice lives in delegation meetings, offices of legal advisors, foreign
ministries, and state governments. In the midst of a crisis, negotiators and
those who advise them often must confront the tradeoff between peace and
justice. Indeed, the questions being debated in the Syrian peace process
reflect this lingering puzzle that negotiators have grappled with for decades.
Individuals must determine their priorities in this regard and create a
pragmatic strategy towards achieving that outcome. It is important to
understand the primary tenants of the peace versus justice puzzle in order
for those involved in a particular peace process to best solve this puzzle.
This article does not propose to answer the weighty question of which
approach best resolves the conundrum of peace and justice, nor does the
article intend to recommend a solution to the complex intricacies of
attempting to merge the two together. Rather, this article strives to examine
a timely facet of this multidimensional puzzle: how to successfully
accommodate the desire for justice by artfully weaving tenets of
accountability into a peace process, without undermining a peace process.
One answer to this pressing question is that the best method is to avoid
justice in the peace process altogether. This is the peace-first approach.
Another, competing answer, is that the most salient choice is to treat justice
as a foundational building block of the peace process. This is the justicefirst approach. There is also a third answer, which suggests that the most
effective method for solving the puzzle is to strike a delicate blend of
justice with peace.
As illustrated by the experiences of a rich array of countries that have
grappled with these questions, there is no clear consensus on the degree of
justice that ought to be brought in to a peace process, nor when and how
justice ought to be introduced. There is, however, a clearer sense that
however these questions are ultimately resolved, there should be at least a
modicum of justice. Although there is an increasing trend towards a

1.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT: EVENTS OF 2016 571 (2017), https://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf [hereinafter HRW WORLD REPORT:
EVENTS OF 2016].
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holistic role of justice in the peace process, the question of “how much
justice” remains unresolved.
The Syrian conflict provides a particularly useful foil in examining
this puzzle. After initial uncertainty as to which approach would take
primacy in the Syrian peace process, the failure of pivotal efforts to
introduce accountability measures at the United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council placed the conflict squarely with the peace-first approach. Since
then, however, actors have persistently pursued efforts to weave in justice
into the peace process, through efforts to document violations, to lay the
foundation for victim catharsis, and to engage in new and creative options
for prosecutorial activity.
This article will first explore the peace-first approach: the priorities of
the supporters of this approach, the potential advantages to pursuing peacefirst, and case studies of peace processes that have successfully and
unsuccessfully followed this approach. Next, this article will examine the
justice-first approach in a similar manner. After analyzing the assumed
dichotomy between peace and justice, the article will explore the potential
(although limited) overlap between these two approaches, identifying the
perspective that justice and peace may be compatible in cases where justice
is artfully woven into peace. The article will also identify the limitations to
this approach. Finally, the article will contextualize the peace versus justice
puzzle, with reference to the Syrian conflict. Through an exploration of
each of these topics, the article seeks to examine the puzzle of
accommodating a drive for accountability, without undermining the ability
of the parties to halt a conflict.
II.

THE “PEACE-FIRST” APPROACH

“The quest for justice for yesterday’s victims of atrocities should not be pursued in
such a manner that it makes today’s living the dead of tomorrow.”
Anonymous United Nations Official2

The peace-first approach can best be understood by first understanding
the general perspective and priorities of the approach and then diving
deeper to examine how the approach is implemented in practice. This
section will begin by discussing the tenants of the peace-first approach and
identifying the primary categories of practitioners that support it. Next, the
section will explore the advantages of the peace-first approach in peace
processes. The section will then focus on actions that can be taken to
implement the peace-first approach in the peace process. Finally, to
illuminate the nuances of the approach, this section will explore the case
2.
Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 258 (1996)
[hereinafter Human Rights in Peace Negotiations].
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studies of South Africa, Bougainville, and Yemen and how the peace-first
approach manifested in each context.
A.

Prioritizing Ending the Conflict

As suggested by its name, the peace-first approach prioritizes ending
the conflict above all other interests.3 The singular role of negotiators is to
seek an agreement that brings the most immediate end to the violence.4 All
other goals and concerns that may impede immediate peace should be
pushed aside. In this way, the approach is single-minded and pragmatic:
peace is the priority and any obstacle to peace should be avoided or
eliminated.
There is a tension between ideal outcomes in peace processes and the
outcomes that parties are in fact able to agree to at that moment. 5 The
peace-first approach will always opt for the latter—the most immediate
resolution of the conflict should be pursued. 6 Rather than allowing the
violence to continue while negotiators pursue a more ideal resolution,
ceasing the violence takes precedence. Indeed, achieving justice against
individuals and parties that committed atrocities during the conflict may be
a goal of some parties in the peace process, but it may not be possible to
achieve peace while also pursuing justice.7 As with any other interest, if
the pursuit of justice will prolong the conflict, justice should not be sought.8
The peace-first approach is often associated with parties to the peace
process who have committed atrocities, with the aggressor and frequently
with mediators. The peace negotiator’s role is to end the conflict, not to
assume the role of a prosecutor and assign responsibility or call for justice.9
As articulated by United States (U.S.) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke—a
key figure in mediating the Bosnia’s Dayton Accords—when asked as to
why he continuously declined to indicate Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic's guilt for the war and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, 10

3.

Id. at 251.

4.

Id. at 255–56.

5.

Id. at 249, 252.

6.

See id. at 252.

7.

I. William Zartman, Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes, in PEACE
VERSUS JUSTICE: NEGOTIATING FORWARD-AND BACKWARD-LOOKING OUTCOMES 1, 6 (I. William
Zartman & Victor Kremenyuk eds., 2005).
8.

Id.

9.

Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.

10.
Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Functions of Justice and Anti-Justice in the PeaceBuilding Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 161, 186 (2003).͒
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“[t]his is tough slogging, and my job was not to make moral judgments, [ . .
. ] and the highest goal here was to avoid war and bring peace.”11
B.

Benefits of the Peace-First Approach

The peace-first approach’s prioritization of ending the conflict has
advantages. Bringing immediate peace saves lives and ends human
suffering. 12 Additionally, peace ends harm to the environment and
destruction of infrastructure, which are by-products of the conflict, and
reconstruction efforts may begin sooner. 13 The focus on peace also
encourages national reconciliation and social reconciliation.14
1.

Saving Lives

Ending the conflict as soon as possible results in lives being saved and
human suffering ceasing more rapidly. Pursuing objectives other than
peace may prolong the conflict and thus result in more casualties and harm.
Although atrocities may have been committed, ending the conflict as
quickly as possible prevents more from occurring.15
2.

Ending Harm to the Environment and Infrastructure

Conflicts have disastrous impacts on the natural environment and
infrastructure. Achieving peace not only ends the harm being caused to the
environment and infrastructure, but also allows reconstruction efforts to
begin in the state sooner than if the conflict was to continue. By
prioritizing peace, the natural environment can be protected and efforts to
heal it can be initiated. Additionally, prioritizing peace allows the state and
its people to begin rebuilding its infrastructure—such as homes, hospitals,
schools, roads, and power supplies—sooner.
More immediate

11.
Hearings on the Nomination of Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke to Serve as U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Rel. U.S. Sen., 106th Cong. 101–02
(1999) (statement of Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke).
12.

Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 250.

13.
U.N., Dep’t of Econ & Soc. Affairs, Peacebuilding Support Off., Peacebuilding
Commission, Working Group on Lessons Learned, Economic Revitalization in Peacebuilding and the
Development of Service Based Infrastructure 1, 4 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/
pdf/doc_wgll/desa_pbso_background_paper.pdf [hereinafter Revitalization in Peacebuilding].
14.
See Orlaith Minogue, Peace vs. Justice: The Utility of Amnesties, 29 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
306, 308 (2010); Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties,
and A Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293, 304–06 (2005).
15.

See Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 258.
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reconstruction in turn prevents the compounding of harmful byproducts of
the conflict, such as lack of access to medical attention or education.16
3.

Promoting Reconciliation

Achieving peace without pursuing justice can lead to national and
social reconciliation. Undertaking prosecutions can allow animosity
between the national and societal factions to continue to fester. Granting
amnesty and achieving peace may instead lead to forgiveness and
reconciliation. 17
Offering amnesty can encourage “gestures of
reconciliation which can contribute to reestablishing normal relations in the
life of a nation which has been divided.”18
C.

Achieving Peace-First in Practice

There are a number of diplomatic tools available to pursue a peacefirst approach. These include limiting peace negotiation participants to
those with the ability to actually end the violence (the guys with guns so to
speak); accommodating and at times appeasing those interests, minimizing
the role of justice mechanisms; and at times providing blanket amnesty.
1.

Singular Objective of Ending the Conflict

To achieve peace, it is necessary to be singularly focused on ending
the conflict. The focus of any agreement is a cessation of hostilities
coupled with subsequent demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration
of combatants.19 Where necessary some sort of power sharing arrangement
can be established to induce the parties to cease hostilities.20 The mandate
and means for deploying peacekeepers or monitors is also a priority, and
the establishment of some mechanisms to coordinate international
assistance for reconstruction. The mediators and the parties must resist
pressure to expand their mandate to include topics such as deep
constitutional or electoral reform (beyond creating a framework or process
16.

Revitalization in Peacebuilding, supra note 13, at 4, 7–8.

17.

Newman, supra note 14, at 304.

18.
Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=C6692EB184B
56F56C12563CD0043A476 (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (discussing the purpose of Additional Protocol
II’s amnesty provision).
19.
See Johannes Langer et al., Peace v. Justice: The Perceived and Real Contradictions of
Conflict Resolution and Human Rights, in 8 CRITERIOS - CUADERNOS DE CIENCIAS JURÍDICAS Y
POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL 165, 167 (2015) (Colom.).
20.

Id.
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for some future progress on these issues), the creation of new human rights
bodies, and most certainly the establishment of complicated mechanisms
for accountability. 21 The mediators and the parties must avoid the
temptation to be diverted or tempted to use the peace process to create a
modern inclusive democratic state.22 That is the task of the parties—with
assistance from the international community—only after the conflict has
ended.
2.

Negotiating with the Guys with Guns

To end a conflict, it is necessary to induce those actively engaged in
the conflict to cease hostilities. It is not necessary to have the consent of
civil society, refugees, internally displaced persons, marginalized
populations, and women (unless they are armed actors). Including nonarmed actors distracts from the ability of the mediator to navigate the
interests of the armed actors and creates space to introduce issues unrelated
to bringing about an immediate end to the conflict. Only on the rarest
occasions do armed combatants place accountability on the table as a key
interest. Likely this is because anyone engaged in armed activity perceives
that they may be brought before a tribunal; especially in light of the morally
equivalent approach of seeking to “hold all sides accountable” even when
one party is responsible for the overwhelming majority of atrocities. Only
armed combatants should be at the negotiation table, and the mediator
should engage exclusively with their interests.
3.

Accommodation and Appeasement

Frequently it is necessary to accommodate or even appease the
interests of the armed actors. While there is an emerging global consensus
on issues such as democratic reform and the protection of human rights,
these are seldom the objectives of all the major armed groups participating
in the conflict. At times one of the armed groups is interested in promoting
the demise of a repressive regime or defending a marginalized population
from oppression. At other times the armed group is just interested in “their
turn at the table” of corruption and repression.
There is always one major armed group—often the government—that
is interested in retaining the status quo, and it is unlikely that the status quo
is a democratic and human rights-respecting political structure. Frequently,
it is in the interest of one or more of the armed groups to avoid
accountability for any crimes that may have been committed by it or its

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 177.
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forces during the conflict.23 Given that nearly every conflict in the past few
decades involved the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity
by at least one of the armed actors, there is little appetite for accountability.
It is the job of the mediator to find a way to embrace the political reality
and accommodate these less than ideal or altruistic interests to get the
armed actors to cease the killing.24
4.

Minimizing Justice

To accommodate or appease the armed actors it is often, if not always,
necessary to minimize the creation of any mechanisms of justice that may
be used to hold the armed actors accountable for war crimes.25 Who, after
all, would sign an agreement that might bring an end to a conflict, only to
find that he will be tried for war crimes, delegitimized in the eyes of his
community, and incarcerated, preventing him from enjoying the fruits
(legitimate or otherwise) of his armed actions?
In fact, recent statistical research indicates that for conflicts between
2002 and 2013, the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
in a conflict significantly decreased the probability of reaching a timely end
to the conflict.26 The author of this research points out that the pursuit of
justice may undermine peace by “threatening leaders’ political survival and
personal freedom.”27 Moreover, an armed party may also be incentivized to
continue the conflict to make the gathering of evidence against them more
difficult.28 Even justice-based mechanisms that are not prosecutorial, like
truth commissions, should be avoided because they may also prolong
negotiations and the conflict. The mediators must always remember that no
matter how morally appealing it may be to create accountability for war
crimes, assigning responsibility or punishing bad acts is not the purpose of
the peace process—the only concern is ending the conflict.29

23.

Id. at 170–71.

24.

See Langer et al., supra note 19, at 170–71.

25.

Id. at 170.

26.
Alyssa K. Prorok, The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal
Court and Civil Conflict Termination, 71 INT’L ORG. 213, 214–15 (2017).
27.

Id. at 215.

28.
Id. at 222 (prohibiting evidence gathering undermines investigators’ ability to develop
sufficient evidence to start a case).
29.

See Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.
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Amnesty

In addition to minimizing the creation of accountability mechanisms, it
may be necessary to simply agree upon a blanket or conditional amnesty.30
Because actors may be unwilling to step down from power or cease
hostilities so long as they or their associates face the possibility of
punishment, amnesties may be leveraged as a trade-off.31 In some instances
there may be no alternative to granting amnesty as a precondition, so as to
end the conflict more rapidly. 32 While morally unappealing, so is the
prospect of the further loss of life. Amnesty has been an integral part of
numerous peace agreements, including Bougainville, 33 Sierra Leone, 34
South Africa,35 and Yemen.36
D.

Case Studies

The peace-first approach has been tried and implemented in many
conflicts. South Africa is often used as the archetype of success for the
approach and the model of the benefits of prioritizing peace.37 In 1948, the
white National Party became the governing party of South Africa.38 The
party consolidated its power and instituted the statewide program of

30.
PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE?: WAR CRIMES AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 29 (2002).
31.
Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the
International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 495 (2003).
32.

Minogue, supra note 14, at 307.

33.
Amnesty:
Bougainville Peace Agreement, Art. 331, PEACE ACCORDS MATRIX,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-bougainville-peace-agreement (last visited Apr. 22,
2018) [hereinafter Bougainville Peace Agreement]; Amnesty: Lincoln Agreement, Art. 10, PEACE
ACCORDS MATRIX, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-bougainville-peace-agreement (last
visited Apr. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Lincoln Agreement].
34.
Amnesty:
Lomé Peace Agreement, Art. IX, PEACE ACCORDS MATRIX,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-lom-peace-agreement (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
35.

S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., art. 251, 1993.

36.
AMNESTY INT’L, YEMEN’S IMMUNITY LAW: BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
11 (2012), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/mde310072012en.pdf; Yemen:
Amnesty for Saleh and Aides Unlawful, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:55 PM), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2012/01/23/yemen-amnesty-saleh-and-aides-unlawful [hereinafter Yemen].
37.
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, South Africa’s Regional Engagement for Peace and Security,
FUNDACIÓN PARA LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y EL DIÁLOGO EXTERIOR [FRIDE]
[FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN DIALOGUE] 1, 7 (2007),
http://fride.org/descarga/south.africa.comment.pdf.
38.
NIGEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA: CONQUEST, APARTHEID,
DEMOCRACY 102–04 (5th ed. 2012) (1994).
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apartheid, or racial segregation for the promotion of white interests. 39
Political violence during the apartheid era led to approximately 75,000
people detained without trial, widespread torture, and 21,000 deaths, with
14,000 of these deaths occurring between 1990 to 1994.40
Negotiations between the all-white apartheid South African
government and the anti-apartheid political parties, including the African
National Congress (ANC), resulted in the 1993 interim constitution of
South Africa, which formed the foundation for the first non-racial general
elections in South Africa.41 The interim constitution included an amnesty
clause providing that all persons and parties shall be granted amnesty for
“acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past” through a mechanism
determined by the newly elected Parliament. 42 This provision laid the
foundation for a mechanism to determine conditional amnesties. The
express purpose of the amnesty was to advance national “reconciliation and
reconstruction.”43 Notably, key party negotiators, such as Dullah Omar, the
ANC representative and future South African Minister of Justice, have
confirmed that a peace agreement would not have been reached without the
amnesty clause in the interim constitution.44
After elections, in 1995 the Parliament passed a law establishing the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 45 The Truth Commission was
designed to give effect to the amnesty clause in the constitution by granting
amnesty to all persons who made a “full disclosure of all the relevant facts
relating to acts associated with a political objective committed in the

39.
See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 187–90 (3d ed. 2001)
(recounting the institutionalization of the apartheid era in South Africa by the National Party through
consolidation of resources and legislative activities); see also RODNEY DAVENPORT & CHRISTOPHER
SAUNDERS, SOUTH AFRICA: A MODERN HISTORY 379–83 (5th ed. 2000) (describing the National
Party’s dominance in government and removal of the coloured vote to prevent any dilution of this
power).
40.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. OF S. AFR., A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY: ANALYSING THE
REPRESSION OF THE APARTHEID STATE (Max Coleman ed., 1998).
41.
See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. art. 251, 1993; see Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National
Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 753, 757–58 (1998) (enumerating the
specific voting changes made by the 1993 Constitution that would allow for the first multi-racial
election in South African history).
42.

S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. art. 251, 1993.

43.

Id.

44.
59 (2002).
45.

LYN S. GRAYBILL, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: MIRACLE OR MODEL?
Id.
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course” of apartheid.46 While not without controversy, most commentators
consider the amnesty-based peace process to have been successful in
bringing an end to the South African conflict and laying the foundation for
a lasting peace.47
Another conflict where a peace-first approach prevailed during the
peace process was the Bougainville civil war, fought between the
government of Papua New Guinea and the region of Bougainville.48 In this
case the parties agreed upon an unconditional blanket amnesty. 49 The
brutal civil war between the government of Papua New Guinea and the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army lasted nearly a decade and resulted in the
deaths of 15,000 to 20,000 civilians and fighters—ten percent of the
Bougainville population.50 The conflict was characterized by war crimes
and atrocities, including razing villages and attacks on civilians by the
government, and rape and torture by both parties.51 The peace agreements,
which rendered a plan for Bougainville to become an autonomous entity
with the right to eventual hold an independence referendum, included a
provision that granted “amnesty and pardon” to all persons involved in
crisis-related activities or convicted of offenses arising out of crisis-related
activities. 52 Despite a relative failure to fully implement the peace
agreement, the amnesty is generally considered to have successfully moved
Bougainville into a period of lasting peace.53
The ongoing conflict in Yemen has also seen attempts to resolve the
conflict using a peace-first approach. The conflict began in 2011 when,
caught up in the momentum of the Arab Spring, Yemeni students rose up
demanding social change.54 What started as a peaceful protest demanding
improved living conditions and jobs turned violent when government
46.
Promotion of National United and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (2005), http://www.
justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf (S. Afr.).
47.
See, e.g., Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties A Second Chance, 25 BERKLEY J.
INT’L L. 283, 293, 295, 314 (2007).
48.
Peter Reddy, Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil War, Peacekeeping and Restorative
Justice, 11 CONTEMP. J. REV. 117, 117–19 (2008).
49.

See id. at 117.

50.

Id. at 117, 119.

51.

Id.

52.

Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 33; Lincoln Agreement, supra note 33.

53.

Reddy, supra note 48, at 119.

54.
See Khaled Fattah, Yemen: A Social Intifada in A Republic of Sheikhs, 18 MIDDLE E.
POL’Y 79, 81 (2011) (describing the 2011 “Youth-led Revolt” in Yemen and what factors contributed to
the societal unrest within the country); see also Sheila Carapico, Yemen Between Revolution and
Counter-Terrorism, in WHY YEMEN MATTERS: A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 29, 30 (Helen Lackner ed.,
2014) (depicting instances of cultural transformation, including women’s participation in protests,
blossoming during the Yemen Revolution).
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security forces killed fifty-two protestors. 55 This event fractured the
government with many generals, ambassadors, and government leaders
defecting. 56 Government security forces targeted and killed antigovernment organizers, summarily executing demonstrators, arbitrarily
detaining persons of interest, performing acts of torture, and treating
civilians to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.57 Within a year, over
2000 people had been killed and more than 22,000 injured.58
With the conflict turning in the favor of the opposition, the Gulf Cooperation Council stepped in to negotiate an end to hostilities and a transfer
of power agreement. 59 The peace agreement brokered by the Gulf
Cooperation Council and approved by the U.N. approved peace deal,
provided immunity for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his
aides.60 The agreement—President Saleh signed in November 2011 and the
sitting Yemeni Parliament passed granted immunity to Saleh from
prosecution for any crimes during his thirty-three-year tenure. 61
Specifically, the peace agreement provided that President Ali Abdullah
Saleh was entitled to “complete immunity from legal and judicial
prosecution” for any acts that occurred during his presidency and until the
date the law was passed.62 The agreement also shielded from prosecution
those who served under Saleh, by providing that immunity is granted to
55.
Fattah, supra note 54, at 81–82. But see Mohammad Farazmand, The Nature of 2011
Arab Uprisings: A Comparative Analysis, 2 IRANIAN REV. FOREIGN AFF. 7, 15 (2011) (marveling at the
unexpected phenomenon of a divided Yemen unifying under the singular demand to remove President
Saleh and remaining peaceful in the face of government violence).
56.
See, e.g., Carapico, supra note 54, at 34–35 (listing the different categories of individuals
who resigned in outrage of the March 18 sniper attack).
57.
E.g. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Visit by the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights to Yemen, ¶¶ 32–43 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/21 (Sept. 16, 2011).
58.
Ahmed al-Haj, Yemen Says More Than 2,000 Killed in Uprising, WASH. POST (Mar. 18,
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemen-says-more-than-2000-killed-in-upris
ing/2012/03/18/gIQAGOtcLS_story.html?utm_term=.6c8b804b3184; see generally Chris Baker Evens
et al., Yemenis Oust Saleh Regime (Yemen Revolution), 2011–2012, GLOBAL NONVIOLENT ACTION
DATABASE (Aug. 28, 2012), https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/yemenis-oust-saleh-regimeyem
en-revolution-2011-2012 (summarizing the different protests and events that resulted in the death of
Yemenis during the year of the Yemen Revolution).
59.
See Wojciech Grabowski, The Role of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in The
(De)Stabilization of Yemen, in ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 127, 131–35
(Rafaá OĪarowski & Wojciech Grabowski eds., 2016) (reviewing the elements of the GCC’s power
transfer proposal and its failure to resolve the issues at the heart of the Revolution).
60.

Yemen, supra note 36.

61.

Id.

62.
(Yemen).

Law No. (1) of 2012, Granting Immunity from Legal and Judicial Prosecution arts. 1, 5
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“officials who have worked under the President—in state civil, military and
security agencies—in connection to politically motivated acts carried out
during the course of their official duties[.]”63 In exchange, Saleh was to
leave office within thirty days, transferring power to his Vice President.64
Yemen is in the midst of a brutal civil war, and until recently it was
President Saleh who co-led a coalition rebelling against the government
installed by the peace agreement.65 There is nearly unanimous agreement
among commentators that the amnesty played a key role in permitting the
former President to retain his political influence and plot a return to power
through civil war.66
III.

THE “JUSTICE-FIRST” APPROACH
“If you want peace, work for justice.”
Pope Paul VI67

The justice-first approach will be explored in a similar format to the
previous section on the peace-first approach. First, the tenants of the
justice-first approach and the primary categories of practitioners that
support it will be identified. Next, the section will explore the advantages
of taking a justice-first approach in peace processes. The section will then
focus on actions that can be taken to implement the justice-first approach in
the peace process. Finally, the section will examine the case studies of
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Uganda and Sudan.
A.

Prioritizing Accountability

The “justice-first” approach advances the notion that accountability
through prosecution must be an integral aspect of any negotiated agreement
or post-conflict plan.68 While the justice-first approach does seek peace, the
approach supports the idea that quick peace should not come at the cost of
the pursuit of justice.69 While peace may be achieved temporarily through a
peace-first approach, durable, long-term peace cannot be achieved without
justice. Although insisting upon accountability mechanisms may prolong
63.

Id. art. 2.

64.
Yemen’s Saleh Agreed to Transfer Power, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 24, 2011), http://aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2011/11/2011112355040101606.html.
65.

See id.

66.

See id.

67.

Pope Paul IV, Homily on World Peace Day (Jan. 1, 1972).

68.

Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 170.

69.

See id.
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the conflict, the eventual peace that is created is more likely to be
sustainable. The justice-first approach is willing to cope with a longer
conflict in order to achieve a sustainable peace.
The justice-first approach has garnered much support. Victims
frequently demand a retributive approach towards perpetrators due to the
grave nature of human rights violations.70 Parties to a conflict who have
disproportionately suffered crimes at the hand of the opposing party
generally support the justice-first approach, as do individual victims. 71
Additionally, many states, particularly those who helped found the ICC and
who have ratified the Rome Statute, tend to promote a justice-first approach
to peacemaking. 72 Countless international non-government organizations
(NGOs) are dedicated to promoting justice for crimes committed and to
preparing for future prosecutions or other justice mechanisms, and even
more NGOs not directly involved have taken a firm stance that justice
should be an inextricable part of peacemaking.73
B.

Benefits of the Justice-First Approach

With the formalization of international laws on war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and other atrocities as well as the establishment of
prosecutorial mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable, the justice-first
approach recognizes that this progress is meaningless if justice is waived.
Furthermore, the justice-first approach asserts that the implementation of
justice mechanisms assists in creating stable peaceful societies in postconflict states. Justice mechanisms promote this by establishing individual
responsibility and denying collective guilt, delegitimizing institutions and
war criminals responsible for the commission of atrocities, establishing an
accurate historical record, providing victim catharsis, and promoting
deterrence.74

70.

CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: JUSTICE
6–7 (2004); see also Reddy, supra note 48, at 119.

VS. PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION

71.

See SRIRAM, supra note 70, at 6–7.

72.
See Catherine Gegout, The International Criminal Court: Limits, Potential and
Conditions for the Promotion of Justice and Peace, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 800, 800 (2013).
73.
See JULIANE KIPPENBERG & PASCAL KAMBALE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: HOW NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO
THE PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS 14–18 (Alison Des Forges & Richard Dicker eds., 2004),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/icc0904/icc0904.pdf.
74.

Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 170.
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Denying Collective Guilt

If justice is not pursued, guilt may be assigned to an entire population
rather than the individuals responsible for the crimes. 75 Additionally,
because justice mechanisms attach responsibility to specific persons, they
lessen the risk that victims and third parties will view an entire group or
population as to blame for the harm. 76 By avoiding a perception of
collective guilt, a post-conflict society may reconcile and heal.
2.

Delegitimizing Institutions and War Criminals

Justice mechanisms delegitimize institutions and leaders responsible
for the commission of atrocities. Justice can advance a sustainable end to
conflict by punishing perpetrators and removing wrongdoers from
leadership and delegitimizing their ideology. 77 Furthermore, justice
mechanisms identify the institutions responsible for crimes and helps
provide a basis for dismantling them.78
3.

Establishing an Accurate Historical Record

Justice mechanisms can establish an accurate historical record of the
conflict, which contributes to long-term peace. The “collective historical
record” that prosecutions produce provides legitimacy to the new postconflict government while delegitimizing the former regime. 79 Such a
record also allows societies to learn from the past, have a mutual
understanding of the actions of all parties, and move towards communal
reconciliation based on a shared understanding of the truth.80
4.

Facilitating Victim Catharsis

Holding violators accountable through justice mechanisms facilitates
victim catharsis. Enduring peace requires justice and accountability
because when the underlying cause of a conflict goes unaddressed and
75.

Id.

76.

Id. at 171.

77.
See Laurel E. Fletcher, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? Transitional Justice and Effacement
of State Accountability for International Crimes, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 447, 450 (2016); Scharf &
Williams, supra note 10, at 170.
78.
Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as A Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and
International Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 485, 490 (1996).
79.
RUTI G. TEITEL, GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105
(2014) (finding that historical accounts provide states with self-knowledge shining a light of past
offenses and abolishing these abuses in the new societal order).
80.

See Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 174–75.
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victims do not receive redress, the risk of returning to conflict remains
high.81 This is particularly true when perpetrators of violence or human
rights abuses are granted amnesty and therefore escape punishment. In the
absence of formal justice the victims and other individuals who feel
wronged may engage in extrajudicial means to achieve justice, including
violence.82 Through trials, victims are also able to recover—or establish—
dignity as the possessors of legal rights, which, in turn, come with legal
remedies. 83 In recognizing victims and providing them legally ordered
restitution, prosecutions also provide a venue for victims to heal.84
5.

Deterrence

Accountability also promotes long-term peace by deterring future
atrocities.85 Post-conflict trials remove and punish leaders who perpetrated
gross violations, preventing such individuals from committing further
violations. 86 Conversely, if persons, particularly leaders, are not held
responsible, they may feel emboldened by their impunity and be more
likely to interfere with the peace-building process or commit future
crimes.87 The incorporation of justice mechanism “are a foundational and
forward-looking affirmation that no group, including public officials and
the armed forces, is above the law and that the new democracy will not
tolerate such behavior.”88 The implementation of justice mechanisms can
reinforce broader security and justice reforms to support the post-conflict
state’s ability to strengthen rule of law and establish a framework for
sustainable peace.89 In this way, the justice-first approach believes future
81.
Peace Versus Justice: A False Dilemma, ICTJ (May 9, 2011), https://www.ictj.org/news/
peace-versus-justice-false-dilemma.
82.
TOVE GRETE LIE ET AL., POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONS WORKING PAPER NO. 5: POSTCONFLICT JUSTICE AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 5
(2007).
83.
Reed Brody, Justice: The First Casualty of Truth?, NATION (Apr. 12, 2001), https://www.
thenation.com/article/justice-first-casualty-truth (concluding that the immunity from justice that a small
group of elites in Haiti received which allowed them to get away with murder and plunder for
generations left the majority of poorer citizens with the impression they had not rights).
84.
Antoine Hol, The Theatre of Justice: On the Educational Meaning of Criminal Trials, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND MEMORIES 71, 83–84 (Chrisje Brants et al. eds., 2013).
85.

Prorok, supra note 26, at 214.

86.

LIE ET AL., supra note 82, at 5.

87.

Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 171.

88.
Brody, supra note 83. But see RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 11 (2000) (arguing
that trials are backward-looking at the same time).
89.
U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note by the Secretary-General: United Nations
Approach to Transitional Justice (Mar. 2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note
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crimes can be deterred by demonstrating that such crimes will be punished,
developing the institutions capable of punishing any future crimes, and
establishing a strong framework for rule of law.
C.

Achieving Justice-First in Practice

To implement a justice-first approach to peace, it is necessary to
ensure that an accountability mechanism exercises jurisdiction over those
who may be responsible for the commission of atrocities. The mechanism
may be an existing court or tribunal, or it could be one created for the
particular conflict by the Security Council, created by the U.N. in
agreement with the state and endorsed by the General Assembly, or by the
parties to the peace process.90 The mechanism may also be active during
the peace process, or it may come into force after the process, but with no
retroactive jurisdiction.91
Peace processes are more likely to confer jurisdiction to an
accountability mechanism when the peace process is inclusive of the
interests of all key stakeholders, not just the armed combatants. While the
armed actors are less likely to seek the inclusion of an accountability
mechanism, civil society, victims, marginalized populations, and other
groups who were harmed during the conflict and did not, themselves,
commit atrocities are likely to seek justice. A transparent peace process is
more accessible to these stakeholders and makes it more likely that they
will be able to assert their interests for insertion in the peace agreement.
Accountability mechanisms are most likely to be fair, balanced, and
successful in states that emerge from conflict as democracies. The peace
process itself should model the democratic process and inclusive
representation that is hoped to be achieved in the state.
There are a number of justice-based mechanisms that can be employed
to further the justice-first approach. These include referral to the ICC; the
creation of an ad hoc tribunal; the establishment of hybrid tribunals; the
creation of domestic war crimes chambers, the application of universal
jurisdiction, and the avoidance of amnesty. Notably, the parties can

_March_2010FINAL.pdf; Padraig McAuliffe, Transitional Justice’s Impact on Rule of Law: Symbol or
Substance?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 74, 90 (Cheryl Lawther et al. eds.,
2017) (questioning whether capacity-building and rule of law are realistic objectives due to the
selectivity of prosecutions and the complexity of dealing with past crimes, which could blur the line
between rule of law and political judgment).
90.
See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courts: Some Questions and
Answers, U.N. DEP’T PUB. INFO. (Oct. 1998), http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/iccq&a.htm [hereinafter
Rome Statute: Q&A].
91.

See id.
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activate some of these mechanisms, while others are activated by the
international community.
1.

The International Criminal Court

The ICC can prosecute crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes.92 The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over atrocities if: (1)
the atrocities were committed by or on the territory of states that have
subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, (2) the U.N. Security
Council refers the matter to the court, or (3) the state refers the matter to the
court.93 The court also has jurisdiction over nationals of state parties to the
Rome Statute, regardless of where the individual’s acts took place.94
States that are parties to the Rome Statue may find the court exercising
jurisdiction and indicting key players in the midst of the peace process or
shortly thereafter. The ICC has ongoing investigations and cases involving,
Burundi, Georgia, the Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya, which were initiated by
the ICC itself. 95 The ICC also unilaterally initiated preliminary
examinations in Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea, Nigeria, Ukraine, and in
Iraq.96
During a peace process, the U.N. Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, may determine that the conflict presents a
threat to international peace and security and confer jurisdiction on the
ICC. 97 The Security Council made such referrals in the case of Sudan
(Darfur)98 and Libya.99 In the case of Sudan, the court indicted Omar AlBashir, the President of Sudan for genocide,100 and in the case of Libya the
court indicted Muammar Gaddafi for crimes against humanity.101
92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.
Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icccpi.int/pages/situations
.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
96.
Preliminary Examinations, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminaryexaminations.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
97.

U.N. Charter ch. VII.

98.
S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2015); Bethel Aregawi, The Politicisation of the
International Criminal Court by United Nations Security Council Referrals, ACCORD (July 21, 2017),
http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/politicisation-international-criminal-court-united-nationssecuri
ty-council-referrals/ (S. Afr.).
99.

S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4 (Feb. 26, 2011); Aregawi, supra note 98.

100. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Case Information Sheet, (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf.
101. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-13, Warrant
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_08351.pdf.
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Arrest,

(June

27,
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States may also refer matters to the ICC on their own initiative, as was
the case with the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Mali.102 These states all referred the matter to
the court while the conflict was still ongoing and arrest warrants,
indictments, or convictions were issued against political and armed leaders
during the peace process or directly after. 103 For instance, in the DRC,
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo founded and led the rebel group, the Union of
Congolese Patriots, and was a key actor in the Ituri Conflict.104 The ICC
issued a warrant for Lubanga’s arrest while the peace process was
underway, and Lubanga was arrested and indicted.105 The ICC also opened
preliminary examinations in Gabon and Palestine at the request of the
states.106 Such a referral may happen during a conflict, retroactively by a
new government, or by including a commitment to refer in the terms of a
peace agreement.107
2.

Ad Hoc Tribunals

On a number of occasions the Security Council, or the General
Assembly acting with a member state, created an ad hoc tribunal to cement
a role for justice in the peace process or as part of the transition process.108
Such tribunals were created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.109 The
Yugoslavia Tribunal was formed and began its investigations and
indictments while the peace process was ongoing, and the Rwanda Tribunal
was established at the conclusion of the conflict.110
102.

Situations Under Investigation, supra note 95.

103. Gegout, supra note 72, at 810; see generally SARA DAREHSHORI, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: WHY ACCOUNTABILITY MATTERS FOR PEACE (Richard Dicker et al.
eds., 2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/07/07/selling-justice-short/why-accountability-matterspea
ce.
104. A Duty to Protect: Justice for Child Soldiers in the D.R.C., WITNESS & AMNESTY INT’L
18, https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/pdfs/dtplessonguide.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) [hereinafter A
Duty to Protect].
105. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Warrant of Arrest, (Feb. 10, 2006),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_02234.pdf; Pursuing Peace, Justice or Both?, INT’L
CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. 2 (2009), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-PeaceJustice-2009-English.pdf [hereinafter Pursuing Peace].
106.

Preliminary Examinations, supra note 96.

107.

A Duty to Protect, supra note 104.

108.

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES (2015) ¶ 9 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015Eng.pdf; Rome Statute: Q&A, supra note 90.
109.

Rome Statute: Q&A, supra note 90

110.

Id.
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Hybrid Tribunals

Hybrid tribunals are a mix of international and domestic actors and can
be created by the international community, the parties themselves, or in
collaboration. 111 The U.N. Security Council, at the request of the
government of Sierra Leone, created the Special Court for Sierra Leone,112
and the General Assembly in cooperation with Cambodia created the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“Cambodia
Tribunal”).113 The Sierra Leone Tribunal conducted prosecutions based on
both international and domestic law for crimes committed during the Sierra
Leone Civil War, which began with a Liberian-led coup attempt.114 The
tribunal tried and convicted a number of high-level officials, including
Liberian President Charles Taylor.115 The Cambodia Tribunal was created
in 2001 to try cases based on international and domestic law for acts
occurring under the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979. 116 To date, the
tribunal has indicted five high-level Khmer Rouge officials, leading to three
convictions117 and two suspensions of proceedings—one due to the death of
the defendant118 and one due to the defendant’s poor health.119
111. Caitlin E. Carroll, Hybrid Tribunals Are the Most Effective Structure for Adjudicating
International Crimes Occurring Within A Domestic State 1 (Seton Hall L. Student Scholarship Paper
No. 90, 2013), http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090&context=student_scholarsh
ip; OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT
STATES, at 13–14, U.N. Sales No. E.08.XIV.2 (2008).
112. S.C. Res. 1315, ¶ 1 (Aug. 14, 2000); TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT’L CENTER
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE UNDER SCRUTINY 1 (2006),
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/SCSL/Case-studies-ICTJ.pdf.

FOR

113. U.N. Audiovisual Library of Int’l Law, Agreement between the UN and the Royal
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, at 1 (2012), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/abunac/
abunac_ph_e.pdf.
114. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 112, at 2, 4, 44; Sierra Leone Profile: Timeline, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419 [hereinafter BBC NEWS].
115.

PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 112, at 27; BBC NEWS, supra note 114.

116.

NUSHIN SARKARATI ET AL., INT’L FED’N HUMAN RIGHTS, THE EXTRAORDINARY
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (ECCC) 3 (Antoine Bernard ed., 2011), http://www.fidh.org
/IMG/pdf/dpcambodgedec2011_final.pdf.
117. Chun Han Wong, Khmer Rouge Leaders Convicted of Crimes Against Humanity, WALL
ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/khmer-rouge-leaders-convicted-of-crimes-against-humanity-14073
1407383717 (last updated Aug. 7, 2014).
118. Ieng Sary (Former Accused), EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS CTS. OF CAMBODIA, https://
www.eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/ieng-sary-fomer-accused (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
119. Associated Press in Phnom Phen, Cambodia’s War Crimes Tribunal Releases Former
Khmer Rouge Leader, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2012, 11:20), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012
/sep/16/khmer-roughe-leader-released.
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Domestic Tribunals

Domestic courts and tribunals may also be utilized to prosecute
atrocities and can be written directly into the peace agreement. Pre-existing
state courts can be used, especially if the state has strong legal institutions
and the courts have jurisdiction over atrocities. Alternatively, a new
domestic tribunal specifically focused on prosecuting atrocities that
occurred during the conflict can be created. In Uganda, the International
Crimes Division (ICD), a special division in the High Court of Uganda, was
established in accordance with the comprehensive peace agreement
between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel
group.120 The ICD’s prosecutorial efforts are complementary to the ICC’s
ongoing LRA prosecutions. 121 In Colombia, under the 2016 peace
agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forced
of Columbia (FARC), FARC members who provide false testimony, fail to
make an honest confession, or refuse to confess at all to the truth
commission can be prosecuted in the Colombia criminal justice system.122
5.

Universal Jurisdiction

Universal jurisdiction is the “assertion of jurisdiction over offences
regardless of the place where they were committed and the nationality of
the perpetrator or the victim.”123 The basis of universal jurisdiction is found
in both the Geneva Conventions and customary international law. 124 A
state may exercise universal jurisdiction by enacting state-level universal
jurisdiction legislation and then proceeding with investigations and trials, or
by the state courts assert international law, rather than state law.125 One of
the first instances of states exercising universal jurisdiction were the
120. Kirsty McNamara, Seeking Justice in Ugandan Courts: Amnesty and the Case of Thomas
Kwoyelo, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 653, 653 (2013).
121. International Crimes Division, JUDICIARY: REPUBLIC UGANDA, http://www.judiciary.
go.ug/data/smenu/18/International%20Crimes%20Division.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) [hereinafter
UGANDA JUDICIARY].
122. Nicolás Carrillo-Santarelli, An Assessment of the Colombian-FARC ‘Peace Jurisdiction’
Agreement, EJIL: TALK!: BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/anassess
ment-of-the-colombian-farc-peace-jurisdiction-agreement/.
123. Universal Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, ICRC (Mar. 2014), https://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/2014/universal-jurisdiction-icrc-eng.pdf.
124. Id. Under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, “[s]tates are required to search for
alleged offenders ‘regardless of their nationality,’ and either bring them before their own courts or hand
them over for trial by another State Party which has made out a prima facie case.” Id. While customary
international law supports a state’s right to exercise universal jurisdiction, it does not require states to
exercise it. Id.
125.

Id.
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prosecutions of former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet in courts in both
Spain and England.126 Ultimately, both Spanish and British courts made
their decisions grounded in universal jurisdiction as codified in their
domestic laws, 127 and these cases set off a firestorm, bringing universal
jurisdiction front and center in efforts to hold violators accountable for war
crimes and crimes against humanity.128

126. See Patrick Wegner, No Limits for Justice? Universal Jurisdiction and the Case of Former
Chadian President Hissene Habré, JUST. CONFLICT (Dec. 18, 2011), https://justiceinconflict.org/2011/
12/18/no-limits-for-justice-universal-jurisdiction-and-the-case-of-former-chadian-president-hissenehabr
e/ (naming Pinochet’s case “the most famous” to be brought under universal jurisdiction); Universal
Jurisdiction, INT’L JUST. RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/cases-before-nationalcourts/dome
stic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (including Pinochet’s case on its list of
“Prominent Cases Involving Universal Jurisdiction”); see generally Inbal Sansani, The Pinochet
Precedent in Africa: Prosecution of Hissène Habré, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 32 (2001) (reviewing the
application of universal jurisdiction in the case of Pinochet); Sofie A. E. Høgestøl, The Habré
Judgement at the Extraordinary African Chambers: A Singular Victory in the Fight Against Impunity,
34 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 147, 148–49 (2016) (discussing the seesaw between the Spanish and English
courts on what legal standards to apply to Pinochet’s case). For more on the efforts of the Spanish court
to prosecute Augusto Pinochet, see generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and
Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (2011).
127. See Sansani, supra note 126, at 33 (finding both the Spanish and English courts grounded
their jurisdiction decisions in domestic law that codified universal jurisdiction over certain activities).
In Spain, Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power grants Spanish courts jurisdiction over
crimes that can be classified as torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, or other crimes in
contravention of international agreements. MARGARITA LACABE, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
AGAINST CHILEAN AND ARGENTINEAN REPRESSORS IN SPAIN: A SHORT SUMMARY (1998), http://www.
derechos.net/marga/papers/spain.html. Under this law, the Spanish court claimed jurisdiction over
Pinochet since the complaint alleged genocide, terrorism, and crimes against humanity. Id. Similarly,
England had ratified the Torture Convention and subsequently incorporated that international agreement
into its domestic law allowing universal jurisdiction over cases of torture. Tanaz Moghadam, Note,
Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction: Lessons from Hybrid Tribunals Applied to the Case of Hissène
Habré, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 471, 480 (2008). This being the case, U.K. courts had
jurisdiction over Pinochet and could extradite him to Spain based on his conviction for torture. Id. at
481.
128. See Paul Chevigny, The Limitations of Universal Jurisdiction, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Mar.
2006), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/97/32133.html (recognizing the
Pinochet case as the start of the “high tide” of universal jurisdiction cases); see also Ex-Chad Dictator
Indicted in Senegal, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 3, 2000, 7:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/0
2/03/ex-chad-dictator-indicted-senegal (viewing the Pinochet case as reaffirming the principles of
universal jurisdiction wherein states can judge crimes against humanity no matter where the acts
occurred and can extend this jurisdiction even to former heads of state).
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Barring Amnesty

Many scholars argue that amnesty for crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide is in and of itself a violation of international law.129
The U.N. has also established guidelines that prohibit its representatives
from supporting amnesty provisions. 130
Indeed, the international
community tends to hold that perpetrators of war crimes and human rights
violations should be held accountable. 131 Moreover, some argue that
customary international law also obligates states to bring perpetrators of
international crimes to justice.132 Parties may be legally obligated to pursue
justice mechanisms as a part of the peace process.
In some states, there is a combination of the above-mentioned
accountability mechanisms. For instance, in Bosnia, the ad hoc Yugoslavia
Tribunal was initiated during the conflict and later, after the peace
agreement, domestic prosecutions began as well.133 In Rwanda, the ad hoc
Rwandan Tribunal
functioned
simultaneously with
domestic
prosecutions. 134 Additionally, in Rwanda, the gacaca courts, traditional
justice system, provided community-level truth and reconciliation. 135 In
Colombia, the ICC has begun preliminary investigations in parallel to the
domestic prosecutorial process.136

129.

Pursuing Peace, supra note 105, at 1.

130. William A. Schabas, National Amnesties, Truth Commissions and International Criminal
Tribunals, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 373, 374 (Bartram S. Brown
ed., 1st ed., 2011). However, Article 6(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II both include references to the right of a person to be
pardoned or receive amnesty. Id. at 375. One caveat is that the context in which both are written seems
to refer to cases of capital punishment, not post-conflict situations. Id.
131.

See LIE ET AL., supra note 82, at 1.

132.

Id.

133. What Is the Former Yugoslavia?, U.N. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia (last visited Apr. 22, 2018)
[hereinafter ICTY].
134. Rwanda: International Tribunal Closing Its Doors, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 23, 2015,
2:50 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/23/rwanda-international-tribunal-closing-its-doors.
135. U.N. Dep’t of Pub. Info., The Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda (Mar. 2014),
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20Justice%202014.pdf.
136. See generally OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2014 (2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PreExam-2014.pdf [hereinafter 2014 REPORT].
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Case Studies

The justice-first perspective can be seen in the peace processes and
peace agreements of many states. The International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia was established through U.N. Security Council
resolution while the conflict in Bosnia was ongoing.137 During the ongoing
peace process, the Yugoslavia Tribunal was granted the authority to begin
indicting individuals perceived as responsible for atrocities. 138 The
President of the self-proclaimed Republka Srpska Radovan Karadžiü and
his commanding general, Ratko Mladiü, were indicted for war crimes,
which prevented them from even attending the peace negotiations at
Dayton.139 The indictments issued by the ICC provided the international
community with moral clarity as to who was responsible for the conflict,
and helped to provide a rationale for when the U.N. Security Council
ordered a no fly zone and eventual air strikes against the Serbian forces to
halt the genocide. In Dayton, Serbia was represented by Slobodan
Miloševiü, and during the negotiations, the New York Times quoted a
Yugoslavia Tribunal official saying “[w]e cannot deny that (Milosevic) is a
suspect.”140 Miloševiü was indicted in 1999, four years after signing the
Dayton Accords,141 he was arrested in 2001, and died in prison in 2006
while his trial was ongoing.142
In post-genocide Rwanda, prosecution of perpetrators of the genocide
was embraced as the means for the restoration of law and order in the
state.143 Justice was a priority in reconciliation and transitioning after the
violence. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established by
the U.N. Security Council, prosecuted high-level perpetrators of the
genocide while domestic tribunals addressed lower-level perpetrators. 144
137.

ICTY, supra note 133.

138.

Id.

139. RICHARD H. STEINBERG, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FACING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 218 (2016); see Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History: Negotiating the Dayton Peace Accords,
ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, http://adst.org/2014/11/the-dayton-peace-accords/#.Wm3li
JM-eRs (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
140.

Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.

141. Michael P. Scharf, The Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., June 5,
1999, https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/4/issue/3/indictment-slobodan-milosevic.
142. Marlise Simons & Alison Smale, Slobodan Milosevic, 64, Former Yugoslav Leader
Accused of War Crimes, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/world/euro
pe/slobodan-milosevic-64-former-yugoslav-leader-accused-of-war.html.
143. IZABELA STEFLJA, CHALLENGES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA 1 (2012),
https://www.africaportal.org/publications/challenges-of-transitional-justice-in-rwanda/.
144.

Id. at 1–2.
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Additionally, the gacaca courts, a traditional justice system, provided truth
and reconciliation at the community-level.145
In some instances, the ICC has also begun prosecution efforts through
its own initiative or at the request of states while parties are negotiating or
after parties have reached agreement, thus prioritizing justice through its
own volition.146 In 2004, the Ugandan government referred its conflict with
the LRA to the ICC.147 In 2005, in Uganda, the ICC issued arrest warrants
for high-level members of the LRA, including its leader Joseph Kony,
while negotiations between the LRA and the government were ongoing.148
All suspects remain at large, except Dominic Ongwen, who surrendered
himself in 2015.149 A draft comprehensive peace agreement in 2008, which
was ultimately not signed by Kony, also prioritized justice, providing for a
special chamber in the Ugandan courts to prosecute LRA leaders.150 Based
on the draft peace agreement language, the International Crimes Division is
a special Division of High Court of Uganda and is designed to operate in
parallel to the ICC.151
In Sudan the ICC also issued arrest warrants to begin prosecution
efforts for atrocities that took place in Darfur while the peace process was
underway.152 The arrest warrants included a warrant for the President of
Sudan, Omar al-Bashir.153 The Sudanese government strongly protested the
ICC’s actions and has refused to cooperate with investigations or the arrest
warrants. 154 Regional institutions, including the African Union, voiced
support of the Sudanese government’s protests.155

145.

Id.

146.

2014 REPORT, supra note 136, at 2.

147.

Situation in Uganda: ICC-02/04, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda.

148.

Id.

149.

Id.

150.

Pursuing Peace, supra note 105, at 2.

151.

UGANDA JUDICIARY, supra note 121.

152.

Pursuing Peace, supra note 105, at 2.

153.

Id.

154.

Id.

155.

Id.
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PEACE WITH JUSTICE

“We have learned that the rule of law delayed is lasting peace denied, and that
justice is a handmaiden of true peace.”156
Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations

The purpose of this section is to identify the core components of a
third approach to the peace versus justice puzzle: peace with justice. The
peace-first approach highlights the obstacles to peace (and the resolution of
conflict) posed by the pursuit of justice. The justice-first approach on the
other hand, underscores the impossibility of sustainable peace absent
genuine accountability. The “peace with justice” approach, meanwhile,
advances the notion that peace and justice are not quite so mutually
exclusive as the former two approaches would indicate—rather, in certain
circumstances parties to a negotiation can artfully weave the two
together. 157 There are a variety of techniques by which to accomplish
this. 158 This section will provide a brief overview of the “peace with
justice” approach, followed by a discussion of the primary mechanisms or
techniques for pursuing both peace and justice. The complicated interplay
of these various mechanisms is illustrated by the diverse attempts to build a
“peace with justice” framework in Colombia, Sierra Leone, the Côte
d’Ivoire, and Cambodia.159
There is an emerging third approach to the peace versus justice puzzle.
This approach claims that parties to a conflict can mutually pursue peace

156. Statement, Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Ministerial Meeting of the Security
Council on Justice and the Rule of Law: The United Nations Role, U.N. Statement S/PV4833 (Sept. 24,
2003).
157. Bartáomiej Krzan, International Criminal Court Facing the Peace vs. Justice Dilemma, 2
INT’L COMP. JURIS. 81, 81 (2016); see generally Alex Whiting, An Investigation Mechanism for Syria:
The General Assembly Steps into the Breach, 15 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 231 (2017); Gabriella Blum, The
Crime and Punishment of States, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 57 (2013); WILLIAM SCHABAS, KEIN FRIEDEN
OHNE GERECHTIGKEIT?: DIE ROLLE DER INTERNATIONALEN STRAFJUSTIZ [NO PEACE WITHOUT
JUSTICE? THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW] (Edith Nerke & Jürgen Bauer trans., 2013)
[hereinafter NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE]; Linda M. Keller, The False Dichotomy of Peace Versus
Justice and the International Criminal Court, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 12 (2008); Beth Van Schaack,
International & US Support for Transitional Justice Initiatives, JUST SECURITY (July 1, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/31737/international-support-transitional-justice-initiatives/.
158. See, e.g., Renée Jeffery, Sequencing Transitional Justice Mechanisms: Lessons from the
Solomon Islands, MIDDLE E. INST. (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.mei.edu/content/sequencingtransitionaljustice-mechanisms-lessons-solomon-islands; Paul Gready & Simon Robins, From Transitional to
Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice, 8 INT’L J. TRANS. JUST. 339, 344 (2014).
159. See generally Whiting, supra note 157; Blum, supra note 157; Keller, supra note 157;
Van Schaak, supra note 157.
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and justice.160 This approach rejects the perceived tensions between peace
and justice as a “false dichotomy.” 161 Under this approach, peace and
justice are mutually reinforcing, as opposed to mutually exclusive.162 The
question, then, becomes not which goal to pursue, but rather when and
how. 163 Although this third approach introduces an intriguing concept,
there are ultimately important limitations to this approach as well.164
The primary tenets of the “peace with justice” approach can be
summarized as:
1) peace and justice are inextricably connected to both reinforce
and complement one another;
2) the promotion of both, regardless of how complex and
difficult, should be pursued;
3) there is a grave need for peace, but it should be found in
conjunction with recognition of the demand for justice; and
4) when mishandled, peace and justice may clash, but peace
should never justify impunity.165

Supporters of this approach argue that law is a cornerstone to any
peace-building mission, and thus, pursuing peace with justice seems a
logical step in transitioning a state from conflict to sustainable peace.166 By
integrating peace with justice during a post-conflict transitional period,
peace-builders can provide oversight both to the laying down of arms and
efforts at capacity-building to administer justice. 167 Additionally, when
peace is combined with justice, the perception of justice may shift from the
retributive to the restorative, such that states and citizens more effectively
seek reconciliation. Under this view, a framework for long-term peace that
contemplates more than an immediate end to a conflict relies on justice to
be both sustainable and enduring.168 In support of this argument, states can
160.

See Krzan, supra note 157, at 81.

161. Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and
Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 211 (2008) [hereinafter Achieving
Peace with Justice].
162.

Langer et al., supra note 19, at 183.

163.

Id.

164.

See generally DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN

A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS (2014).

165.

See Krzan, supra note 157, at 87.

166.

See OFF. HIGH COMM’R HUM.RTS., RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES:
MAPPING THE JUSTICE SECTOR, HR/PUB/06/2, 1 (2006).
167.

Id.

168.

See id.
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take a variety of steps to intertwine peace and justice. These actions
include a “sequencing” approach and a “holistic” approach. 169
Additionally, states often incorporate a range of justice-oriented
mechanisms that sometimes expand beyond the notion of direct
accountability. Further mechanisms for interlacing peace with justice
include:
1) non-state justice mechanisms;
2) reparations; and
3) truth-seeking.170

A.

Methods to Meet the Needs of the State Post-Conflict

States could use any of these methods, with consideration to which
method most meets the needs of the post-conflict state in question.
1.

Sequencing

As the term suggests, the approach of “sequencing” involves the
strategic phasing of various transitional justice mechanisms.171 Rather than
asking if peace or justice should be pursued, the question then becomes
when and how states should pursue both objectives.172 With sequencing,
there is no need to compromise justice for peace as justice will be pursued
after parties reach a peace agreement. 173 This perspective accepts that
justice may be a necessarily long-term goal, but also recognizes the
importance of justice and underscores that accountability will eventually
manifest. 174 However, opponents of this process argue that under this
approach justice will not occur quickly enough to satisfy citizens and
victims, because it takes time to gain the capacity, legitimacy, and
independence to review claims or overturn amnesties.175

169.

Jeffery, supra note 158; Gready & Robins, supra note 158, at 344.

170. LUC HUYSE & MARK SALTER, TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER
VIOLENT CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 3 (2008); see generally Reparations,
INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/reparations
(last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
171.

Jeffery, supra note 158.

172.

Krzan, supra note 157, at 82.

173.

See Prorok, supra note 26, at 213.

174.

Jeffery, supra note 158.

175. Daniel Serwer, Justice and Peace: A False Dichotomy, SYRIA JUST. & ACCT. CTR. (July
25, 2016), https://syriaaccountability.org/updates/2016/07/25/justice-and-peace-a-false-dichotomy/.
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Holistic

Additionally, states can accomplish peace and justice through holistic
measures. 176 These measures involve non-prosecutorial accountability
measures that contribute actively to peace while simultaneously supporting
justice.177 Potential mechanisms under this holistic understanding include
truth and reconciliation commissions, local or traditional justice, public
acknowledgment mechanisms, and/or institutional reform. 178 Alternative
methods of justice may be more successful than prosecutorial means of
justice. 179 This framework broadens the approach to transitional justice
beyond merely institutional responses, so as to incorporate broader political
and social involvement. 180 Further, these non-prosecutorial mechanisms
have similar justice goals to traditional prosecutions:
1) discovering, clarifying, and acknowledging past abuses;
2) responding to victims’ needs;
3) contributing to justice and accountability;
4) outlining institutional responsibility and recommending
reforms; and
5) promoting reconciliation and reducing conflict.181

3.

Non-State Justice Mechanisms

Non-state justice mechanisms, sometimes referred to as traditional
justice, incorporate indigenous and customary practices into the transitional
justice process. 182 For instance, gacaca courts, local community courts
inspired by the Rwandan traditional courts, emerged as a traditional
mechanism to assist Rwanda’s national courts with trials of the 130,000
people imprisoned following the Rwandan genocide. 183 The U.N.
Secretary-General emphasized the vital role of “indigenous and informal
traditions for administering justice or settling disputes,” while conforming

176.

Gready & Robins, supra note 158, at 344.

177.

Id.

178.

Id.

179.

See Achieving Peace with Justice, supra note 161, at 209, 212–13, 227.

180.

Gready & Robins, supra note 158, at 344.

181. Diba Majzub, Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal Court, 3
MELB. J. INT’L L. 247, 261 (2002).
182.

HUYSE & SALTER, supra note 170.

183.

Id. at 37.
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with international law to ensure the inclusion of all groups in the justice
process.184
4.

Reparations

Granting reparations, meanwhile, is an internationally recognized
method of restoring victims of serious crimes to their financial, physical, or
psychological position before suffering the harm in question.185 Victims’
reparations can take multiple forms, including restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.186 Whatever
the form of reparations, the purpose of the mechanism is to provide a
meaningful response to the harm suffered, that can be tailored to the
specific context, needs, and priorities of the victim in question—and in
doing so, this mechanism can theoretically meet at least some of the
underlying purposes of accountability.
5.

Truth-Seeking

Truth-seeking is the process of investigating past human rights
violations to determine what happened, why it happened, and to what effect
in order to prevent future abuses.187 Mechanisms for truth-seeking include
truth commissions, commissions of inquiry, and fact-finding missions. 188
Truth commissions are either non-judicial or quasi-judicial bodies that
investigate past abuses to establish the truth of the violations and to publish
a final report that can make policy recommendations, disseminate victims’
voices, and serve as a historical record.189 There have been over forty truth
184. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004). Nonetheless, non-state trials may not
be adequate in ethnically or religiously diverse states because each group may develop its own
prosecutorial system, which may result in unequal treatment. HUYSE & SALTER, supra note 170, at
182–83.
185.

Reparations, supra note 170.

186. See Pablo De Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 451,
452–53 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2006); INTER-AM. INST. HUM. RTS., CONTRIBUTION OF TRUTH, JUSTICE,
AND REPARATION POLICIES TO LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES 88 (2011).
187. INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE & KONTRAS, DERAILED: TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE IN INDONESIA SINCE THE FALL OF SOEHARTO 9, 17 (2011); see also U.N. Secretary-General,
United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice: Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, 8 (Mar.
2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf [hereinafter
U.N. Approach to Transitional Justice].
188.

U.N. Approach to Transitional Justice, supra note 187, at 8.

189. Truth Commissions, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2008), http://ictj.org/sites/default/
files/ICTJ-Global-Truth-Commissions-2008-English.pdf;
see
also
Integrated
Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration Standards: 6.20 DDR and Transitional Justice, U.N. DISARMAMENT,
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commissions over the last three decades,190 highlighting the popularity (and
potentially the utility) of these mechanisms. Depending on the objective
pursued, truth commissions allow for both the victims to tell their story and
the perpetrators to admit the crimes they committed in order to promote
forgiveness and reconciliation. 191
Similar to truth commissions,
commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions investigate past human
rights abuses to discover the truth but follow narrower mandates 192 that
focus on a particular event, category of crime, or time period.193
B.

Peace with Justice in Colombia

The peace process in Colombia reflects one manifestation of the peace
with justice approach. In particular, elements of both peace and justice
approaches were integrated into the agreement that was ultimately adopted
in Colombia in December 2016. 194 This agreement, between the
Colombian government and the FARC, included the establishment of a

DEMOBILIZATION, & REINTEGRATION RESOURCE CTR. 3 (Dec. 2009), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/
files/UN-DDR-and-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf.
190. Kieran McEvoy et al., Criminology and Transitional Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
CRIMINOLOGY 391, 392 (Alison Liebling et al. eds., 6th ed. 2017); OFF. HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS.,
RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES: TRUTH COMMISSIONS, HR/PUB/06/1, 1 (2006),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawTruthCommissionsen.pdf; see Essential Best
Practices for Truth Commissions, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1 (Dec. 2009), http://www.
iccnow.org/documents/ICTJ_SDN_briefing_AUPD-TJRC.pdf; Truth and Memory, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUST., http://ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/truth-and-memory (last visited
Apr. 22, 2018).

OF

191. U.S. DEP’T STATE, Truth Commissions (May 16, 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/257772.pdf.
192.

See U.N. Approach to Transitional Justice, supra note 187, at 8.

193. JANE ALEXANDER, DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., A SCOPING STUDY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
POVERTY REDUCTION 32 (2003), http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/ssaj56.pdf.
While such
mechanisms are particularly useful to establish the truth, a restrictive mandate may also result in
overlooking certain abuses. Id. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the United Nations expresses serious
concerns over the mandate of the three Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or
Disappearances of Persons, which was limited not only in terms of geographic and temporal scope, but
also as to the types of human rights violations under review. Id.; see also U.N. Office of the High
Commissioner, OHCHR Technical Note: The Nepal Act on the Commission on Investigation of
Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation, 2071 (May 21, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/documents/
countries/np/ohchrtechnical_note_nepal_cidp_trc_act2014.pdf; Commissions of Inquiry: Sri Lanka,
U.S. INST. PEACE (Jan. 1, 1995), https://www.usip.org/publications/1995/01/commissions-inquiry-srilanka.

AND

194. Nicholas Casey, Colombia Signs Peace Agreement with FARC After 5 Decades of War,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/world/americas/colombia-farcpeace
-agreement.html [hereinafter Casey, Colombia Signs].
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justice mechanism that offers amnesty.195 The provisions of the agreement
emphasize the importance of “consolidating peace and realizing the rights
of victims,” the “promot[ion of] a stable and lasting peace,” and the
Colombian state’s responsibility to “investigate, clarify, prosecute and
sanction serious violations of IHRL [international human rights law] and
IHL [international humanitarian law].” 196 These provisions reflect the
blend of peace and justice that the agreement strives to accomplish.
In particular, the peace deal included provisions to establish a
Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of
Non-Repetition (Comprehensive System) to carry out a comprehensive
transitional justice plan, based on a 2015 “Special Peace Jurisdiction”
agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC. 197 The
Special Jurisdiction for Peace was designed to include both a Peace
Tribunal and Judicial Panels to address cases of “serious violations of
human rights and humanitarian law” committed by FARC members.198
Although the justice mechanism has prosecutorial functions, the
agreement provides categorically that any perpetrators, who confess to
atrocities, will be exempt from prison, jail, or any “equivalent” form of
detention. 199 Instead, those who confess will be given “‘sanctions’ that
have a ‘restorative and reparative function’ . . . [.]” 200 These sanctions
entail “projects” that will be designed to aid victims of the conflict. 201
FARC members, who were not primarily responsible for the commission of
the most serious crimes and who wholly confessed their acts, will receive
either amnesty or alternative penalties such as community service and acts
of reparation.202

195.

Id.

196. Acuerdo Final Para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y
Duradera [Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace] ch. 5,
(Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesosyconversaciones/Documentos
%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf [hereinafter Final Agreement].
197. Carrillo-Santarelli, supra note 122; Alejandro Valencia Villa, Challenges Facing the
Truth Commission of Colombia, PEACE PROGRESS: SEEKING TRUTH (May 2017), http://www.icipperlapau.cat/numero31/articles_centrals/article_central_4/.
198. Final Agreement, supra note 196, at 182; Human Rights Watch Analysis of ColombiaFARC Agreement, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2015, 6:21 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/
12/21/human-rights-watch-analysis-colombia-farc-agreement.
199.

Final Agreement, supra note 196.

200.

Human Rights Watch Analysis of Colombia-FARC Agreement, supra note 198.

201.

Id.; Final Agreement, supra note 196, at 182.

202. Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2.III; José Miguel Vivanco, Colombia Peace
Deal’s Promise, and Flaws, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 27, 2016, 10:39 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2016/09/27/colombia-peace-deals-promise-and-flaws.
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If, however, FARC members refuse to confess, provide false
testimony, or fail to make an honest confession in a timely manner, they
will be prosecuted in the Colombian criminal justice system—although they
may achieve a reduced sentence by making a partial confession.203 Those
who take responsibility but do not do so in a timely manner may face a five
to eight year prison sentence.204 Those who do not confess at all and are
found guilty will serve a fifteen-to-twenty year prison sentence. 205
Conversely, an individual who committed gross human rights violations—
such as gender-based war crimes and crimes against humanity—will not be
eligible to receive amnesty and will face criminal prosecution. 206 Even
then, those who immediately confess their crimes may receive a less severe
punishment, such as a non-prison detention restriction on their liberty.207
The contours of the 2016 peace agreement draw on earlier Colombian
practice.208 In many ways, the 2016 agreement followed the accountability
framework that had been previously utilized to demobilize various antiFARC paramilitary groups, in particular the Justice and Peace Law in
2005. 209 To support demobilization, the Law allowed individuals that
participated voluntarily to take part in a truth-telling process via a special
prosecution tribunal.210 If fighters participated in this truth-telling process,
they were eligible for reduced sentences or even amnesties.211 In practice,
these mechanisms provided around ninety percent of the paramilitary
members with what is essentially de facto amnesty.212
The peace agreement introduced in 2016 attempted to draw from this
past Colombian experience, so as to strike a fine balance between peace and

203.

Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2.III.60; Carrillo-Santarelli, supra note 122.

204. Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2.2.III; Colleen Murphy, Colombia’s Special
Jurisdiction for Peace, U. ILL. (Oct. 9, 2017), https://will.illinois.edu/legalissuesinthenews/program/
colombias-special-jurisdiction-for-peace.
205.

Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2.2.III; Murphy, supra note 204.

206.

Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2.II.40.

207.

Id. at ch. 5.1.2.III.60; Carrillo-Santarelli, supra note 122.

208. Paul Williams & Tiffany Sommadossi, The Colombian Referendum: A Lesson on Peace
Without Justice, HUFFPOST (Oct. 7, 2016, 2:33 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/thecolombian-referendum-a-lesson-on-peace-without_us_57f7d9dfe4b090dec0e71064.
209.

Id.; see generally L. 975, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).

210. Williams & Sommadossi, supra note 208; see generally L. 975, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
211. See generally L. 975, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); Colombia: The
Justice and Peace Law, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://cja.org/where-we-work/colombia/
related-resources/colombia-the-justice-and-peace-law/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
212.

Colombia: The Justice and Peace Law, supra note 211.
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justice.213 Indeed, Colombian President Santos, one of the architects of the
peace agreement, highlighted in reference to the agreement that “perfect
justice would not allow peace.”214 Instead, President Santos argued that the
deal “achieves as much justice as possible while transitioning from conflict
to peace.”215 Ultimately, the system proposed was closer to an amnesty
based truth and reconciliation commission, than a true direct accountability
system.216
In October 2016, the (already signed) peace agreement was put to a
popular referendum.217 To the surprise of many, 50.24% of the population
voted to reject the peace agreement, and the referendum failed. 218 The
primary concerns of those who voted to reject the peace agreement
centered, in large part, on the balance of justice interlaced into the
agreement.219 For instance, one major concern was the legal immunity for
rank-and-file soldiers of the FARC,220 who were allegedly responsible for
crimes including murder, kidnapping, and rape against civilians.221 Another
concern was the lack of defining details for the tribunal in which FARC
leaders were to be tried, combined with the opportunity for FARC leaders
to receive reduced sentences or potentially even amnesty in return for early
confessions.222
An additional barrier to adopting the agreement was the agreement’s
commitment to provide FARC fighters with a monthly stipend for two
years, and the provision of $2500 payments to individual ex-combatants to
start a business.223 The ability of the FARC to restructure into a political
party under the peace deal was also a divisive issue. 224 Moreover, the
agreement permits FARC members not serving prison sentences to run for

213.

Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.3.1.

214.

Vivanco, supra note 202.

215.

Id.

216. Rahul Srivastava, The Colombian Peace Referendum, ST ANDREWS FOREIGN AFF. REV.
(Oct. 7, 2016), http://foreignaffairsreview.co.uk/2016/10/the-colombian-peace-referendum/.
217.

Id.

218.

Id.

219.

Id.

220.

Id.

221.

Srivastava, supra note 216.

222.

Id.

223.

Id.

224. Colombia Referendum: Voters Reject FARC Peace Deal, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252.
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office, and grants the FARC ten congressional seats for two terms.225 In
other words, there was a poignant concern—held by various international
human rights organizations in addition to the Colombian population—that
those most responsible for the commission of atrocity crimes would not be
held sufficiently accountable for their participation in the conflict.226
Following the rejection of the peace agreement in the October 2016
referendum, the draft agreement was submitted to the Colombian Congress
for revisions.227 Colombia’s Congress approved a revised version of the
agreement,228 and the public did not vote on the revised document.229 The
Agreement included over fifty changes to the version introduced in the
referendum.230 The new provisions of the agreement clarified the process
for prosecuting FARC members responsible before the special court. 231
However, the new agreement did not provide for prison sentences for those
who confessed to war crimes.232 The reasoning for this was that doing so
would cause the FARC to walk away from the peace agreement.233 The
new agreement also included a provision requiring the FARC to relinquish
assets, some of which were acquired through drug trafficking, to contribute
to a fund for compensating victims. 234 The agreement also did not
introduce limitations to the FARC’s ability to engage as a political party.235

225. Colombia’s Congress Approves Peace Tribunals for ex FARC Rebels, REUTERS (Nov. 28,
2017, 6:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace/colombias-congress-approvespea
ce-tribunals-for-ex-farc-rebels-idUSKBN1DS1C6.
226.

Vivanco, supra note 202.

227. Stephen Gill, Colombia’s Congress to Vote on Peace Deal Next Week, COLOM. REP. (Nov.
24, 2016), https://colombiareports.com/colombias-congress-vote-peace-deal-next-week/.
228. Nicholas Casey, Colombia’s Congress Approves Peace Accord with FARC, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/world/americas/colombia-farc-accord-juanmanu
el-santos.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Casey, Colombia’s Congress].
229.

Id.

230.

Associated Press, Colombia’s Government Formally Ratifies Revised Farc Peace Deal,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2016, 3:27), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/01/colombiasgovern
ment-formally-ratifies-revised-farc-peace-deal [hereinafter Associated Press, Colombia].
231.

Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2; Casey, Colombia’s Congress, supra note

232.

Casey, Colombia’s Congress, supra note 228.
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233.

Id.

234.

Associated Press, Colombia, supra note 230.
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Ultimately, in December 2016 the revised peace agreement went into
effect,236 and preparations for its implementation began. In assessing the
justice framework introduced as a result, it is also worth noting that
Colombia has also ratified the ICC, and therefore, the domestic mechanisms
under the agreement will operate while ICC investigations and preliminary
examinations in Colombia continue to function in parallel. 237 The ICC
opened a preliminary examination of the situation in Colombia in June
2004, on alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes. 238 This
preliminary examination is ongoing as of 2018, and most recently has
included field visits by the ICC to clarify various aspects of the Special
Jurisdiction for Peace.239
C.

Peace with Justice in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone presents another instance of peace interwoven with
justice, although distinct from the Colombian context. In particular, the
Sierra Leone experience illustrates the practice of providing broad amnesty
via a peace agreement, combined with targeted, high-level prosecutions.
The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement contained an amnesty provision that
prevented prosecutions for acts criminalized under Sierra Leonean law.240
In 2000, a hybrid Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established
with the broad purpose of truth-telling and establishing a historical record
of atrocities.241 In 2002, however, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (a
hybrid tribunal) was established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315,
with the purpose of prosecuting crimes under both international law and
Sierra Leone’s domestic law.242

236. Sibylla Brodzinsky, ‘Welcome to Peace’: Colombia’s Farc Rebels Seal Historic
Disarmament, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2017, 15:30), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/27/colo
mbia-farc-weapons-war-government.
237. Colombia, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/
colombia (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
238. Preliminary Examination: Colombia, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/colombia
(last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
239. Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the
Conclusion of Her Visit to Colombia, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.icccpi.int//
Pages/item.aspx?name=170913-otp-stat-colombia.
240. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, transmitted by Letter Dated 12 July 1999 from Kodjo Menzan of the Security
Council, art. IX, ¶ 2, S/1999/777 (July 7, 1999).
241. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 § 6(1), http://www.sierraleone.org/Laws/2000-4.pdf.
242.

S.C. Res. 1315, ¶¶ 1–2 (Aug. 14, 2000).
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Controversy arose in relation to the interpretation of the amnesty
provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, in light of the prosecutorial
framework of the Special Court. In theory, the amnesty provisions of the
peace agreement would have prevented the Special Court from pursuing
charges for acts criminalized under Sierra Leonean law.243 However, the
Special Court itself interpreted the amnesty provision as inapplicable to the
prosecution of international crimes.244 This interpretation found support in
the U.N.’s approach as the guarantor of the Lomé Agreement; in clarifying
the peace agreement, the U.N. stated that the amnesty and pardon article
was inapplicable to international crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. 245 On this basis, the Special Court proceeded with
prosecutorial action for a select pool of high-level perpetrators, culminating
its work with the conviction of former Liberian President Charles Taylor.246
D.

Peace with Justice in the Côte d’Ivoire

Following the atrocities suffered by civilians in the Côte d’Ivoire’s
2010–2011 post-election crisis, 247 newly-elected President Ouattara
established a Special Investigation and Examination Cell, composed of
judges and prosecutors, to take steps against those most responsible for
atrocity crimes. 248 In 2015, the Special Cell charged more than twenty
individuals, including high-level commanders from both sides. 249 A
national truth commission, the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation
Commission (CDVR), was also established in 2011 to investigate

243. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 10 (2000), http://www.rscsl.org/
Documents/scsl-statute.pdf.
244. Prosecutor v. Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on
Preliminary Motion of the Invalidity of Agreement between the UN and Government of Sierra Leone on
Est. of Special Court, para. II.9 (May 25, 2004), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/SCSL/SCSL-04-15T/Appeal_Decision.htm.
245. S.C. Res. 1315, ¶ 1–1, (Aug. 14, 2000); see There Can be No Amnesty for Genocide and
War Crimes - Annan, U.N. NEWS (Aug. 12, 2004), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
11615.
246. OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE TRIAL OF CHARLES TAYLOR BY THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE APPEAL JUDGMENT 2 (2013), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/sites/default/files/charles-taylor-appeal-brief-20130924_0.pdf.
247. Côte d’Ivoire: 5 Years on, Awaiting Justice, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 22, 2016, 12:01
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/22/cote-divoire-5-years-awaiting-justice.
248.

Id.

249.

Id.
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violations.250 By the time the CDVR’s mandate concluded in 2014, the
entity took statements from more than 72,000 Ivorian nationals. 251 The
final report was provided to President Ouattara, who did not make the
report publicly-available but did commit approximately $16.2 million to
indemnify victims on its basis. 252 A new commission, the National
Commission for Reconciliation and Indemnification of Victims, was
established in March 2015 to oversee a reparations program for victims of
an even wider range of abuses, committed between 1990 and 2012.253 This
package provided a blend of peace-prioritizing mechanisms with measures
for justice that expanded beyond traditional direct accountability.
Additional aspects of direct accountability also filtered into the Côte
d’Ivoire context. For instance, in January 2016 the ICC initiated a joint
trial of former president Laurent Gbabgo and Charles Ble Goude for crimes
against humanity committed in the course of the post-election crisis.254 The
ICC also sought Simone Gbagbo, the former first lady who remained in
Ivoirian custody where she was tried and convicted for “crimes against the
state.” 255 When the ICC claimed that she should be prosecuted for atrocity
crimes in The Hague, the Côte d’Ivoire charged her with crimes against
humanity and retained jurisdiction as a form of “positive
complementarity”256 although she was ultimately acquitted of the specific
crimes against humanity charges. 257 Meanwhile, former President
Gbagbo’s trial started in 2016, and he remains in ICC custody as
prosecutions continue. 258 In 2015 Ouattara was peacefully re-elected. 259
Although not all issues are settled (for example, protests broke out in 2016
250. Virginie Ladisch & Joanna Rice, Cote d’Ivoire Youth Find Voice Through Storytelling,
ICTJ (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.ictj.org/news/cote-divoire-youth-political-voice-stories-war.
251. JIM WORMINGTON, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “TO CONSOLIDATE THIS PEACE OF OURS”:
A HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA FOR COTE D’IVOIRE (Corinne Dufka ed., 2015), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2015/12/08/consolidate-peace-ours/human-rights-agenda-cote-divoire.
252.

Id.

253.

Id.

254.

Côte d’Ivoire: 5 Years on, Awaiting Justice, supra note 247.

255.

Id.

256. Mark Kersten, Hold Your Horses, ICC Complementarity, JUST. IN CONFLICT: BLOG (June
21, 2016), https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/06/21/hold-your-horses-icc-complementarity/.
257. Côte d’Ivoire: Simone Gbagbo Acquitted After Flawed War Crimes Trial, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Mar. 29, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/29/cote-divoire-simonegbag
bo-acquitted-after-flawed-war-crimes-trial.
258.

Prosecutor v. Gbagbo & Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-01/15, https://www.icccpi.int/cdi/gbagbo-

goude.
259. Cote d’Ivoire: Partial Justice, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 26, 2017, 15:02), https://www.
aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2017/01/cote-partial-justice-170126114050818.html (citing
the filmmaker’s Victoria Baux view).
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in relation to various constitutional reforms) violence has largely settled and
economic growth is on the horizon.260
E.

Peace with Justice in Cambodia

Lastly, the Cambodian context provides an instance of peace with
justice, via sequencing. After a decade-long armed conflict between
Cambodia and Vietnam, the Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1991.261
The Paris Peace Accords formalized an arrangement that maintained the
Cambodian Khmer Rouge in political power despite its responsibility for
significant atrocities in Cambodian territory.262 In doing so, and in its more
general avoidance of addressing the issue of atrocity crimes, the Paris Peace
Accords effectively provided the Khmer Rouge with impunity.263 In effect,
the Cambodian peace process prioritized peace and stability, over
accountability.
Justice, however, was eventually introduced into the Cambodian
context in a later period, following the securement of peace. More than
fifteen years after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, efforts for direct
accountability culminated in the establishment of the Cambodian Tribunal
(a hybrid tribunal) in 2006. 264 The court was established by agreement
between the U.N. and the government of Cambodia.265 The purpose of the
court was to prosecute those most responsible for violations of international
law and other grave crimes. 266 Although an imperfect prosecutorial
mechanism, to date the court has convicted three perpetrators.267
The experiences of Colombia, Sierra Leone, the Côte d’Ivoire, and
Cambodia display the diverse methods by which to pursue a “peace with
justice framework.” These case studies illustrate, to various degrees, the
260.

Id.

261. Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, U.S. INST. PEACE (Feb. 22, 2000)
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/final_act_10231991
.pdf.
262. Id.; Philip Shenon, Cause for Alarm?; The Peace Treaty Brings the Khmer Rouge into
Government, and that Frightens Many, N.Y. TIMES (1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/24/
world/cause-for-alarm-peace-treaty-brings-khmer-rouge-into-government-that-frightens.html.
263.

Shenon, supra note 262.

264. UN-Backed Tribunal Sentences Khmer Rouge Leaders to Life in Prison, UN NEWS (Aug.
7, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48433#.Wn9wzpPwZN1.
265.

Id.

266.
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267. Seth Mydans, 11 Years, $300 Million and 3 Convictions. Was the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
Worth It?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/asia/cambodiakhmer-rouge-united-nations-tribunal.html.
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potential utility of developing transitional mechanisms for justice,
providing general amnesties combined with targeted prosecutions, or
sequencing justice mechanisms following the establishment of peace and
stability. Although not without its limitations, this approach demonstrates
that in certain circumstances parties to a negotiation can choose to
interweave peace with justice, rather than pursuing one at the total expense
of the other.
V.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS

The purpose of this section is to explore the interplay between the
approaches of peace-first and justice-first in the context of the Syrian
conflict. The Syrian conflict is characterized by initial uncertainty as to
whether the peace-first approach or the justice-first approach would take
predominance in the peace process. After a pivotal failed effort at the U.N.
Security Council to instill significant justice measures into the Syrian
context, the Syrian process evolved towards a peace-first approach by those
seeking to end, or at least manage, the conflict. However, despite the
traction that the peace-first approach has gained in the Syrian context, there
are persistent efforts by key actors to weave accountability into the peace
process. While these efforts have had a relatively minor impact on the
process, and it is clear the approach to resolve the Syrian crisis will not be
one of justice-first, it remains to be seen whether the final stretch of the
peace process is driven by a peace-first approach, or whether a peace with
justice approach is able to emerge. The seedling efforts towards
accountability that are being instilled into the process now, may ultimately
lay the foundation for moving towards a more focused accountability in the
future.
In order to explore the interplay between the approaches of peace-first
and justice-first in the context of the Syrian conflict, this section will briefly
review the origins of the conflict, its “spill-in” and multi-dimensional
nature, and the U.N. peace process established to resolve the conflict. The
section will then trace the efforts of various key stakeholders to weave
justice into the peace process through several mechanisms such as U.N.
Security Council referral to the ICC, the establishment of a Commission of
Inquiry and an International, Impartial, Independent Mechanism, the
creation of a number of documentation efforts, a proposal for a Hybrid
Tribunal, and the use of universal jurisdiction.
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Origins of the Conflict

The Syrian conflict began with a small group of children writing antigovernment graffiti in Dara.268 They were arrested and tortured, sparking
nationwide protests, and leading to a multi-dimensional civil war now in its
eighth year.269 These nationwide protests against the Assad regime swept
across the country beginning March 2011, 270 coinciding with the Arab
Spring movement that swept through Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.271
The Assad regime responded with force and opposition groups began to
organize, and arm themselves, leading to the formation of the Free Syrian
Army. The Free Syrian Army began to use force in defending against
attacks by the Assad regime, and by mid-2011, what began as peaceful
protests had transformed into a full-fledged internal conflict.272 Fighting
has been near-constant since 2011.273 The conflict has also since expanded
to include a vast number of differing Syrian opposition fighting brigades, as
well as foreign terrorist organizations such as Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS. 274
Since its inception, the Syrian conflict has been marked by widespread
and brutal atrocities. The conflict has been characterized by a death toll
exceeding 470,000 along with more than 11 million displaced, 275 the
documented torture to death of more than 14,000, 276 the use of
internationally prohibited chemical weapons, inherently indiscriminate
barrel bombs, cluster munitions, and the indiscriminate use of incendiary
268. Mark MacKinnon, The Graffiti Kids Who Sparked the Syrian War, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec.
2, 2016), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/the-graffiti-kids-who-sparked-the-syrian-war/
article33123646/.
269. Id.; Avi Asher-Schapiro, The Young Men Who Started Syria’s Revolution Speak About
Daraa, Where it All Began, VICE NEWS (Mar. 15, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://news.vice.com/article/theyoung-men-who-started-syrias-revolution-speak-about-daraa-where-it-all-began.
270. MacKinnon, supra note 268; Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
271. MacKinnon, supra note 268; Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide: Yemen, CORNELL
U. LIBR., http://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=31688&p=200752 (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
272.

Syria: The Story of the Conflict, supra note 270.

273. See Ben Hubbard & Neil MacFarquhar, New Cease-Fire Begins in Syria, but Violations
Are Reported Within Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/world
/middleeast/syria-cease-fire.html; MacKinnon, supra note 268.
274. Syria War: A Brief Guide to Who’s Fighting Whom, BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39528673; see Michael Karadjis, US vs Free Syrian Army
vs Jabhat al-Nusra (and ISIS), NEW POL. (Dec. 19, 2017), http://newpol.org/content/us-vs-free-syrianarmy-vs-jabhat-alnusra-and-isis.
275.
276.

HRW WORLD REPORT: EVENTS OF 2016, supra note 1.

AMNESTY INT’L, HUMAN SLAUGHTERHOUSE: MASS HANGINGS AND EXTERMINATION AT
SAYDNAYA PRISON, SYRIA 5–6 (2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/5415/2017/en/.
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weapons in civilian-populated areas.277 While many of the actors involved
in the conflict are responsible for atrocities, the vast majority have been
(and continue to be) committed by the Assad regime.
B.

Syria—A Multi-Dimensional Spill-In Conflict

In the Syrian conflict there are least six main groups of domestic
forces, along with their international allies, engaged in at least five distinct
conflicts.278 While most wars run the risk of spilling-over into neighboring
states, in the case of Syria the war has spilled into the country, with nearly a
dozen external actors directly supporting parties to the conflict and in a
number of instances deploying their own forces inside Syrian territory.279
The Syrian parties engaged in the conflict include:280
1. Government of the Syrian Arab Republic: The current Syrian
government, which has been under the executive rule of Bashar
al-Assad since July 2000.281
2. Free Syrian Army (FSA): Formed in August of 2011 by
defectors from the Syrian regime, the Free Syrian Army is one of
the predominant Syrian armed opposition groups, comprised of
more than fifty fighting factions.282
3. Kurdish Forces: The People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a
Kurdish force that has been active in the Syrian conflict. 283 The
YPG is considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish
government, and has been linked to the long-term insurgency war
in Turkey.
4. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): A primarily Kurdish
force that also includes local Arab militias, the SDF is comprised
in large part by YPG fighters. 284 The SDF are forces particularly
277.

HRW WORLD REPORT: EVENTS OF 2016, supra note 1.

278. See generally Zachary Laub, Who Is Fighting in Syria’s Civil War?, PBS NEWS HOUR
(May 8, 2017, 9:28 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/fighting-syrias-civil-war.
279. See generally Syria Profile – Timeline, BBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-14703995.
280. Syria: Mapping the Conflict, BBC NEWS (July 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-22798391.
281. Julia Zorthian, Who’s Fighting Who in Syria, TIME (Oct. 7, 2015), http://time.com/
4059856/Syria-Civil-War-Explainer/.
282. Guide to the Syrian Rebels, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-24403003.
283.

Laub, supra note 278.

284. Id.; Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), SYRIAN CIVIL WAR MAP, https://syriancivilwarmap
.com/syrian-democratic-forces/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
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active in northern Syria and benefit from U.S. support in antiISIS operations.285
5. Al Qaeda: Al Qaeda in Syria is comprised largely of nonSyrians, with only limited Syrian membership, and over the
course of the conflict has transformed into a range of Al Qaeda
“linked” organizations, most famously known as “Jabhat alNusra.” 286 Most recently, this entity has been renamed “Hayat
Tahrir al-Sham,” or HTS.287
6. ISIS: Infamously active in Syria, ISIS in this context is
comprised of both Syrian and non-Syrian fighters.288

Third party states and paramilitary organizations engaged in the
conflict include:289
1. Russia: Russia established an air base inside of Syria at the
invitation of the Assad regime in 2015 and deployed bomber and
fighter aircraft as well as special forces. 290 Russia regularly
attacks the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and
occasionally ISIS.291
2. Iran: Iran deployed military forces and a significant number
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) al-Quds
Force.292 Iranian forces on the ground in Syria may outnumber
the military forces of the Syrian regime.293 Iranian forces fight
on behalf of the Assad regime and engage primarily in operations
285.

Laub, supra note 278.

286. ELIZABETH O’BAGY, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 6: JIHAD IN SYRIA 10 (2012),
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jihad-In-Syria-17SEPT.pdf.
287. Tahrir al Sham: Al-Qaeda’s Latest Incarnation in Syria, BBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38934206.
288.

Syria Profile – Timeline, supra note 279.

289. Alexandra Zavis, Who’s Who in Syria: A Look at 8 Key Players in the War, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 3, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-players-syria-war-20151
002-htmlstory.html.
290. Bill Chappell, Russia Begins Airstrikes in Syria After Assad’s Request, NPR (Sept. 30,
2015, 8:37 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/09/30/444679327/russia-beginscondu
cting-airstrikes-in-syria-at-assads-request.
291. Id.; Ryan Browne et al., Russian Forces Fire on US-backed Rebel Group in Syria,
Coalition Says, CNN: POLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/16/politics/russia-fires-on-us-backedforces/index.html (last updated Sept. 17, 2017, 9:50 PM).
292. David Blair, Almost 700 Iranian Troops and Militia Fighters ‘Killed in Syria’ to Preserve
Bashar al-Assad, TELEGRAPH NEWS (May 10, 2016, 5:51 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
2016/05/10/almost-700-iranian-troops-killed-in-syria-to-preserve-bashar-al/.
293. Majid Rafizadeh, Iran’s Forces Outnumber Assad’s in Syria, GATESTONE INST. (Nov. 24,
2016, 3:45 AM), https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/9406/iran-soldiers-syria.
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against the Syrian Opposition, including the Free Syrian Army,
and the Syrian Democratic Forces.294
3. Hezbollah: Hezbollah is quite active in the Syrian conflict,
and as of 2016 an estimated 7000 Hezbollah fighters were based
in Syria. 295 Hezbollah largely fights in support of the Assad
regime, and as such engages primarily in operations against the
Syrian Opposition, including the Free Syrian Army.296
4. Turkey: Turkey deployed several thousand forces into
Syria, 297 both to protect civilians from attack by the Syrian
regime and to prevent Kurdish forces from holding contiguous
territory along the Turkish border. Turkey also deploys monitors
for the de-escalation zones.298 In 2017, Turkey largely succeeded
in securing a swathe of territory in northern Syria known as the
“Euphrates Shield” area.299 Early in the conflict Turkey downed
a Russian MiG fighter, which had crossed into its airspace,300 but
more recently acts in close cooperation with Russia.
5. The United States: The United States provides assistance,
including weapons, to both the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian
Democratic Forces.301 The United States has also conducted air
strikes against Al-Qaeda and ISIS as part of a US-led coalition
focused on the elimination of ISIS.302 Further, the United States
has deployed approximately 2000 special forces and an artillery

294.

Zavis, supra note 289.

295.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM 2016 ch. 6 (2017).
296.

Id.

297. Turkey Ends ‘Euphrates Shield’ Operation in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/turkey-ends-euphrates-shield-operation-syria-1703292114289
70.html; Associated Press, Syria is Currently Host to Thousands of Foreign Troops: Who are They and
Will they Leave?, HAARETZ (Nov. 28, 2017, 12:56 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/middle-eastnews/thousands-of-foreign-troops-in-syria-but-will-they-leave-1.5627108.
298. Iran, Turkey, Russia to Deploy 500 Observers in Idlib, Syria, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS
AGENCY (Sept. 16, 2017, 8:53), http://www.irna.ir/en/News/82665953 (Iran).
299.

Turkey Ends ‘Euphrates Shield’ Operation in Syria, supra note 297.

300. Turkey Shoots Down Russian Warplane on Syrian Border, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34907983.
301. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Confused by All Those Groups Fighting in Syria? We Break it
Down with Arm Patches, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2017, 8:50 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/
middleeast/la-fg-syria-opposition-patches-2017-htmlstory.html.
302. Elizabeth McLaughlin, Two Years of U.S.-led Airstrikes on ISIS in Syria and Iraq in
Numbers, ABC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2016, 11:58 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/International/years-us-ledairstrikes-isis-syria-iraq-show/story?id=41206050.
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unit inside Syria.303 The majority of the United States military
efforts in the Syrian context are aimed towards the elimination of
ISIS.304 Notably, in April of 2017, the United States launched a
substantial cruise missile attack against air assets of the Assad
regime, in retaliation for the regime’s chemical weapons attack
on Khan Sheikhoun.305 In April of 2018, the United States, this
time joined by the United Kingom and France, responded to the
regime’s chemical weapons attack on Douma with additional
targeted strikes against regime military and research assets.
6. United Kingdom, France, and other EU states: These states
provide assistance to the Free Syrian Army and have conducted
air strikes and deployed special forces against Al-Qaeda and
ISIS, particularly as part of the US-led coalition.306
7. Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia provides funding and weapons to
the Free Syrian Army, and allegedly to Al-Qaeda. 307 As a
significant supporter of the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia is
particularly focused on anti-Assad engagement.308
8. Qatar: Qatar provides funding and weapons to the Free
Syrian Army, and allegedly to Al-Qaeda. The majority of
Qatar’s engagement in the Syrian context is particularly focused
on anti-Assad engagement, but not necessarily in cooperation
with Saudi Arabia.309

303. Barbara Starr, As ISIS Retreats, US is Set to Reveal Troop Numbers in Syria, CNN:
POLITICS (Nov. 24, 2017, 12:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/24/politics/syria-us-troops-numbers/
index.html.
304. COLIN H. KAHL ET AL., A STRATEGY FOR ENDING THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR 1 (2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-Syria-Final.pdf; McLaughlin, supra
note 302.
305. Michael R. Gordon et al., Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military-responsesto-syrian-chemical-attack.html.
306. EU May Provide Training to Syrian Rebels, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 4, 2013, 4:18 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-eu-is-set-to-support-syrian-rebels-with-military-traininga-886794.html (Ger.); Who is Supplying Weapons to the Warring Sides in Syria?, BBC NEWS (June 14,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22906965.
307.

Who is Supplying Weapons to the Warring Sides in Syria?, supra note 320.

308.

Zavis, supra note 289.

309. Amena Bakr, Qatar Runs Covert Desert Training Camp for Syrian Rebels, REUTERS
(Nov. 26, 2014, 9:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-qatar-syria/qatar-runscove
rt-desert-training-camp-for-syrian-rebels-idUSKCN0JA1BX20141126.

2018]

Williams, Dicker & Paterson

463

9. Jordan: Jordan provides support to the Free Syrian Army.
Jordan is also an active participant in overseeing de-escalation
zones in Syrian territory, particularly those in the south. 310
10. International Al Qaeda: International Al-Qaeda in Syria has
been active in the conflict since 2012. At the outset of its
participation, Al-Qaeda openly claimed the goal of removing
Assad and creating an Islamic state. Al-Qaeda has continued to
present itself as anti-Assad force throughout the duration of the
conflict.311
11. International ISIS: An offshoot of what was once Al-Qaeda
in Iraq, International ISIS in Syria became particularly prevalent
beginning in 2013, capturing significant portions of Syrian
territory and eventually claiming of Raqqa as its de facto
capital.312 At the peak of its power, approximately ten million
people lived under ISIS control. 313 ISIS engaged in offenses
against Syrian opposition armed groups, the Assad regime, SDF
forces, members of the US-led coalition, and others. As of late
2017 the US-led coalition seeking to eliminate ISIS claimed that
nearly ninety-eight percent of ISIS-held territory has been
liberated.314

The U.N. launched peace negotiations soon after the beginning of the
conflict. 315 The peace negotiations have proceeded through a variety of
iterations and have produced a certain measure of momentum and
accomplishments.316
The initial peace negotiations were headed by former U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan and yielded what has become known as the Geneva
Communiqué. 317 The Communiqué, endorsed by the U.N. Security
Council, provided for a new constitution, free and fair elections, the
310. Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Syrian Rebels Resist Jordan Pressure to Hand Over Border
Crossing, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriajordan/syrian-rebels-resist-jordan-pressure-to-hand-over-border-crossing-idUSKBN1CA116.
311. Valerie Szybala, Al-Qaeda Shows Its True Colors in Syria, ISW (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISWSyriaUpdate-AlQaeda-TrueColors-Syria.pdf.
312. Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps, BBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2018),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034.
313.

Id.

314.

Id.

315. Syria: Intra-Syrian Negotiations, UN NEWS, https://news.un.org/en/focus/syria (last
visited Apr. 22, 2018).
316. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on International
Meeting on Syra in Astana, U.N. Press Release SC/12701 (Jan. 31, 2017).
317.

S.C. Res. 2118, (Sept. 27, 2013).
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establishment of a transitional governing body on the basis of mutual
consent, and other components that have collectively come to form the core
of the negotiating topics in the Geneva peace negotiations.318 The second
phase of the peace negotiations was headed by Lakhdar Brahimi 319 and
produced some limited momentum for a Transitional Governing Body
designed to create an interim arrangement to transition President Assad
from power and set the framework for a new constitution and elections.320
The talks stalled when the Assad regime refused to engage in substantive
negotiations on a political solution.321
Renewed momentum for the peace negotiations culminated in the
adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 in December 2015,
ushering in the third phase of the peace process. 322 Staffan de Mistura
headed the third phase and while producing little in the way of specific
accomplishments has continued to provide a venue for the parties in the
event a desire for serious negotiations emerges.323 The third phase has also
expanded to include a parallel process in Astana, Kazakhstan managed by a
Russian, Iranian and Turkish Troika focused on de-escalation zones
(ceasefires for certain defined areas within the Syrian territory).324 Through
this process a series of de-escalation zones have been established.325 The
de-escalation zones have been somewhat successful in limiting the

318.

Id.

319. Yasmine Saleh & Shaimaa Fayed, Syria Agrees to Ceasefire During Eid Holiday:
Brahimi, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2012, 5:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisisbrahimi/
syria-agrees-to-ceasefire-during-eid-holiday-brahimi-idUSBRE89N0G820121024.
320. Syria Peace Talks Break Up as UN Envoy Fails to End Deadlock, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15,
2014, 10:17), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/15/syria-peace-talks-break-up-geneva.
321.

Id.

322.

S.C. Res. 2254, (Dec. 18, 2015).

323. Tom Miles & Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Calls Syria Talks a ‘Big Missed Opportunity’,
Seeks New Ideas, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2017, 2:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-syria-un/u-n-calls-syria-talks-a-big-missed-opportunity-seeks-new-ideas-idUSKBN1E82TD; Tom
Miles, U.N. Says Planning for Syria Talks Toward End of January, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2015, 5:37 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un/u-n-says-planning-for-syria-talks-toward-end
-of-january-idUSKBN0U513B20151222.
324. Jun Pasaylo, Astana Talks to Fortify Syria Ceasefire Accord, GEOPOL MONITOR,
http://www.geopolmonitor.com/astana-talks-fortify-syria-ceasefire-accord/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018);
Syrian War: All You Need to Know About the Astana Talks, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 30, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/syrian-war-astana-talks-171029160554816.html.
325. Final De-Escalation Zones Agreed on in Astana, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 15, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/final-de-escalation-zones-agreed-astana-170915102811730.ht
ml.
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violence, although violations by the regime and its allies continue.326 At
various times during these three phases the U.N. Security Council has
adopted resolutions supporting the peace negotiations and ratifying various
minor outcomes.327
Whatever momentum the Astana and Geneva processes may have
introduced for a political settlement, it is important to bear in mind that
Assad’s position has been strengthened by the facts on the ground.328 In
particular, with the support of Russia and Iran, the Assad regime has made
sweeping gains in retaking territory from ISIS and the Syrian Opposition.329
Absent a fundamental change in the military landscape, the Assad regime is
likely to maintain a significant military advantage on the ground. Given
this entrenchment, the likelihood of direct accountability for Assad or any
other high-level perpetrators is diminished, at least for the immediate
future.
C.

Seeking to Weave Justice into the Syria Peace Process

As noted above, the Syrian peace process began with uncertainty
towards how to resolve the peace versus justice puzzle—would a peace-first
approach take hold, or would efforts towards instilling justice take
primacy? International actors took the debate to the U.N. Security Council,
testing the waters of the peace versus justice puzzle with resolutions aimed
at creating critical accountability measures. However, these efforts were
quickly chilled by Russian and Chinese vetoes. In the wake of these vetoes,
the Syrian conflict has become characterized by heavy reliance on the
peace-first approach. However, there are persistent and ongoing efforts to
introduce at least a measure of justice into the peace process, and the
balance towards a peace with justice approach may yet tip in the future.
To track the efforts to weave justice into the peace process this section
will discuss the positions of the parties and mediators toward justice in the
Geneva peace negotiations; the actions of the Security Council and the

326. Nada Homsi & Anne Barnard, Marked for ‘De-Escalation,’ Syrian Towns Endure Surge
of Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/world/middleeast/syriade-escalation-zones-atarib.html.
327.

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2254, (Dec. 18, 2015).

328. Laura King & Nabih Bulos, Syria May be in Ruins, but it Looks Like Assad ‘Has Won the
War Militarily’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fgsyria-assad-2017-story.html; Tom O’Connor, How the U.S. Lost the War in Syria to Russia and Iran,
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 11, 2017, 11:25 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/us-lost-war-syria-iran-russiawin
ning-final-battle-674833.
329. O’Connor, supra note 328 (noting that the Syrian government army has retaken almost
every major urban center [excluding Raqqa]).
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General Assembly, the initiatives of civil society and non-state actors, and
the use of universal jurisdiction by some European states.
1.

Peace Negotiations

The parties and mediators to the Syrian peace negotiations have a
mixed record of attempts to introduce accountability measures into the
negotiations. The Syrian Opposition has incorporated a measure of justice
into their proposals, whereas the regime has not meaningfully addressed
accountability.330 The U.N., meanwhile, has been lukewarm at best on the
issue of accountability. 331 In defense of justice, so to speak, the Syrian
Opposition has staunchly refused any negotiation proposals that would
permit the Assad regime to remain in power and thereby avoid
accountability. The Syrian Opposition also has refused to countenance any
proposals that would result in Assad or members of his regime securing de
facto or de jure impunity.332
On the proactive side, the Opposition has been clear that any peace
agreement should result in a tangible mechanism for accountability. The
Opposition has produced a range of public material proposing various broad
frameworks for accountability that could be incorporated into a peace
agreement.333 For instance, in its September 2016 Vision Statement, the
Syrian Opposition calls for a specific transitional justice committee
composed of diverse and competent judges and lawyers, with the aim of
balancing “between reconciliation efforts, on the one hand, and
accountability, on the other.” 334 The committee is charged to fulfill
international transitional justice standards, and develop mechanisms “to
ensure accountability, reparation for the victims [ . . . ] achieve institutional
reform, propose mechanisms to investigate violations and crimes, and keep
records related to human rights violations.”335

330. Syrian Opposition Says Assad Must Go, SBS NEWS, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/syrianopposition-says-assad-must-go (last updated Mar. 13, 2016).
331. Kailey Love, Will U.N.’s Accountability Mechanism Provide Justice in Syria?, WASH.
REP. MIDDLE E. AFF., June–July 2017, at 62, https://www.wrmea.org/digital-issue/june/july-2017digital-flipbook.html.
332. See Nic Robertson & Mohammed Tawfeeq, Bashar al-Assad Needs to Leave Before
There’s Peace, Syrian Opposition Says, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/23/middleeast/syrianopposition-no-bashar-al-assad/index.html (last updated Nov. 23, 2017, 9:24 PM).
333. HIGH NEGOTIATIONS COMM’N, EXECUTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION
BASED ON THE GENEVA COMMUNIQUÉ ¶¶ 44–45 (2016), http://english.riadhijab.com/userfiles/HNC%20
Executive%20Summary%20-%20English.pdf.
334.

Id.

335.

Id. ¶ 46.
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Notably, the Syrian Opposition has not made any calls for the creation
of an ad hoc or hybrid tribunal or other comprehensive accountability
mechanism. The Opposition also has not yet proposed the application of
retroactive jurisdiction of the ICC, by which the (future, transitional) Syrian
state would submit to the ICC’s jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its
jurisdiction taking place on Syrian territory from the onset of the conflict.336
The Assad regime, meanwhile, has rejected all claims for accountability for
violations committed in the course of the conflict. Indeed, the regime has
refused to address the general issue of accountability for war crimes in any
genuine way.337 Rather, the regime has focused attention exclusively on
accountability for supposed “terrorists,” a term that the regime utilizes for
entities that oppose the Assad government.338 The U.N., meanwhile, has
taken a relatively tepid stance in the peace negotiations on issues relating to
justice. In fact, none of the U.N. mediators have ever called for direct
accountability in the context of the U.N.-led peace negotiations.
2.

The U.N. Security Council

Given the lack of intensive engagement by the parties in relation to
accountability measures in the context of the peace process, as well as
larger uncertainty on the geopolitical level, it was unclear in the early stages
of the Syrian conflict which approach within the peace versus justice puzzle
would take hold. There were multiple efforts to introduce justice into the
Syrian context via the U.N. Security Council, which reflected an early
testing ground to determine which approach might come to take primacy in
the Syrian conflict. However, few of these efforts at the U.N. Security
Council found success; following this failure to move forward with
important accountability mechanisms, the peace-first approach took rapid
hold over the Syrian peace process.
For instance, in 2014, some members of the U.N. Security Council put
forth a draft resolution to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC.339 The
resolution received widespread public support by member states of the

336. Jennifer Trahan, New Paths to Accountability for Crimes in Syria and Iraq (Including ICC
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Fighters), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/173
08/paths-accountability-crimes-syria-iraq-including-icc-jurisdiction-foreign-fighters/.
337. Zena Tahhan, Saving Syria: Is International Law the Answer?, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 16,
2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/years-syria-accountability-free-zone-170312
082121458.html.
338. Ben Hubbard, His Grip Still Secure, Bashar al-Assad Smiles as Syria Burns, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/world/middleeast/his-position-still-securebashar
-al-assad-smiles-as-syria-burns.html.
339.

U.N. SCOR, 7180th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).
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United Nations.340 Within the Security Council, thirteen of the Council’s
fifteen member-states voted in favor of the resolution.341 However, both
China and Russia vetoed the resolution.342
The U.N. Security Council has also attempted to lay the foundation for
accountability in relation to the use of chemical weapons in Syria.343 In this
regard the Security Council has experienced a mixed record. While the
Security Council has succeeded in taking steps that allow for a measure of
information-gathering, Russia has constrained these efforts by exercising its
veto power to prevent a strong foundation for accountability.344
In August 2015, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 2235 to
establish a joint mission between the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the U.N. Joint Investigative Mechanisms
(JIM).345 The mandate of the OPCW-JIM was to identify those responsible
for the use of chemical weapons in Syria.346 In August 2016 and again in
November 2016, the OPCW-JIM presented reports that, for the first time,
attributed responsibility for the use of chemical weapons inside Syria to the
Assad regime’s armed forces.347 In a subsequent report, the OPCW-JIM
determined that the Assad regime was responsible for the use of chemical
weapons in the infamous attack on Khan Sheikhun on April 4, 2017.348
340. Ian Black, Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to International Criminal
Court, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2014, 11:07), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russiachina-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court.
341.

U.N. SCOR, 7180th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).

342.

Id.

343. OPCW, Fact Sheet: OPCW - UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (Jan. 2017), https:/
/unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/OPCW-JIM-FactSheet.pdf
[hereinafter OPCW-UN].
344. Black, supra note 340; Michelle Nichols, Russia Casts 10th U.N. Veto on Syria Action,
Blocking Inquiry Renewal, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2017, 4:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usmideast-crisis-syria-chemicalweapons/russia-casts-10th-u-n-veto-on-syria-action-blocking-inquiryrenewal-idUSKBN1DG31I.
345.

OPCW-UN, supra note 343.

346.

Id.

347. OPCW Executive Council Adopts Decision Regarding the OPCW-United Nations Joint
Investigative Mechanism Reports About Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic, ORG. FOR
PROHIBITION CHEMICAL WEAPONS (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcwexecutive-council-adopts-decision-regarding-the-opcw-united-nations-joint-investigative-mechanismre
ports-about-chemical-weapons-use-in-the-syrian-arab-republic/; U.S. Dep’t of State, Fourth Report of
the Joint Investigative Mechanism (2016).
348. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Oct. 26, 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2017/904 (Oct. 26, 2017) [hereinafter U.N.
Secretary General, Letter]. The use of chemical weapons is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the
ICC. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xvii)–(xviii), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 91 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
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In relation to what would be done on the basis of attribution to the
Assad regime, Virginia Gamba—the Head of the OPCW-JIM—declared
that the OPCW-JIM “believes that those with effective control in the
military units referred to in this report or others responsible for the use of
chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic must be held
accountable.”349 To support such accountability, the OPCW-JIM had the
authority to conduct further investigations to determine the specific
individuals involved in perpetrating or organizing the particular incidents in
question.350
In response to this growing momentum towards accountability for the
Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons, Russia cast a veto in
October 2017 to prevent the renewal of the OPCW-JIM’s mandate (which
was scheduled to expire in mid-November 2017). 351 As a result of the
Russian veto, this second potential avenue for accountability through the
UN Security Council was halted.352 From this pivotal point, the Syrian
peace process evolved into a heavily peace-first oriented approach.
3.

The U.N. General Assembly

In addition to efforts by the U.N. Security Council to introduce
mechanisms for justice into the Syrian context, the U.N. General Assembly
has created two primary initiatives. The first is the U.N. Commission of
Inquiry (COI), which is mandated to investigate the commission of
atrocities.
The second is the International, Impartial, Independent
Mechanism (IIIM), which was mandated to collect, analyze and preserve
evidence of the commission of atrocities.353
The COI is a documentation mechanism with a mandate to investigate
“all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011”

349. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Considers Fourth Report by Joint
Investigative Mechanism, U.N. Press Release DC/3668 (Oct. 27, 2016).
350.

U.N. Secretary General, Letter, supra note 348.

351. Rodrigo Campos, Russia Vetoes Extension of Mission Probing Chemical Weapons Use in
Syria, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2017, 11:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriaun/russia-vetoes-extension-of-mission-probing-chemical-weapons-use-in-syria-idUSKBN1CT25P.
352.

Id.

353. Rep. of the H.R.C. on Its Seventeenth Special Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2 (2011);
Frequently Asked Questions on the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under International
Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011 (‘The Mechanism’), UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/Frequently_asked_questions_on_IIIM.pdf (last visited Apr.
22, 2018) [hereinafter FAQ on the IIIM].
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inside Syria.354 The COI has produced more than twenty reports since its
inception in August 2011, documenting numerous violations of
international law after interviewing thousands of witnesses and victims and
analyzing significant physical evidence. 355 Although the COI’s mandate
and purpose represents a fundamentally important task in laying the
foundation for future prosecutions, the COI has struggled to succeed.
Indeed, in August 2017, Carla Del Ponte—former prosecutor for the
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals and one of the three members of the
COI—resigned from the COI in protest of its failure to be effective.356 In
particular, Ms. Del Ponte noted the serious impact of the COI’s limited
powers—without a more sufficient mandate, in her view the COI has “no
possibility of seeking justice for victims.”357 In addition, Ms. Del Ponte
pointed to the inaction of the U.N. Security Council in response to the
COI’s work.358 In describing her decision to leave the COI, Ms. Del Ponte
said, “[i]t was all about the inaction of the security council because if you
look at all the reports we have published, we have obtained nothing in terms
of injustice. It is unbelievable.”359
The IIIM is a mechanism under the purview of the U.N. General
Assembly that was established in part due to Russia’s repeated veto of
Security Council efforts to refer Syria to the ICC.360 The IIIM prioritizes
the collection, analysis, and preservation of evidence of human rights
violations and war crimes—as opposed to directly engaging in
investigations of the acts themselves. 361 The COI is one of the many
sources from which the IIIM obtains evidence. Additional sources for the
IIIM include individuals, states, NGOs, and regional organizations. At the
354. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic: About the
Commission of Inquiry, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
HRC/IICISyria/Pages/AboutCoI.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) [hereinafter About the Commission of
Inquiry].
355.

Id.

356.

Patrick Wintour, UN Syria Investigator Quits Over Concern About Russian Obstruction,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2017, 14:17), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/07/we-arpowerlessunsyria-investigator-carla-del-ponte-quits-over-lack-of-political-backing.
357.

Id.

358.

Id.

359.

Id.

360. James Reinl, Could Syria’s ‘Prosecutor without A Tribunal’ Work?, AL JAZEERA (May
31, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/syria-prosecutor-tribunal-work17052911
0910869.html.
361. Responding to Misconceptions Regarding the IIIM, SYRIA JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY
CTR. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://syriaaccountability.org/updates/2017/08/02/responding-to-misconceptionsregarding-the-iiim/ (stating that the IIIM is headed by Catherine Marchi-Uhel, a seasoned former judge
and war crimes attorney).
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present, the IIIM does not publicly disclose its findings and
recommendations.362 The overarching policy of the IIIM is to essentially
compile as much evidence of human rights violations and war crimes in
Syria as possible and share that information with groups seeking to
prosecute those crimes once it has vetted them for commitment to similar
goals and standards as the IIIM.363
The IIIM is designed to support other entities engaging in
prosecutorial efforts, including regional organizations and states pursuing
options under universal jurisdiction, by sharing evidence with these
entities.364 As a result, the IIIM could potentially increase the number of
claims brought against perpetrators in Syria.365 The IIIM may also support
any future prosecutions brought by the ICC in the event a new Syrian
government submits to its retroactive jurisdiction, or prosecutions brought
by a future hybrid court for Syria.366 Alternatively, if the IIIM deems that
no such prosecution will effectively come to pass, the IIIM could release
the information as part of a truth commission.
4.

Civil Society

In addition to justice efforts put forth by the U.N., civil society has
taken steps to introduce justice mechanisms into the Syrian context. In
particular, despite the obstacles to direct accountability in the short-term, a
range of groups are engaging in efforts to at the least establish a record of
violations, and potentially to support future efforts for justice.367 Given the
advent of new technology combined with burgeoning political will and
resourcing, efforts to generate and preserve documentation have
proliferated. 368 In particular, civil society groups have utilized complex
documentation mechanisms that could support accountability as well as a
range of expanded justice mechanisms, including reparations, truth-telling,
and memorialization.369 Taken in combination with U.N. documentation
efforts such as those pursued by the COI, civil society documentation
362.

Id. (adding that the IIIM will occasionally release periodic reports).

363.

About the Commission of Inquiry, supra note 354.

364.

FAQ on the IIIM, supra note 353.

365.

Responding to Misconceptions Regarding the IIIM, supra note 361.

366.

FAQ on the IIIM, supra note 353.

367. CITIZENS FOR SYRIA, SYRIAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS REALITY AND
CHALLENGES 7–9 (Mhd. Bay trans., 2017), https://citizensforsyria.org/OrgLiterature/Syrian_CSOs_
Reality_and_challenges_2017-CfS_EN.pdf
368.
369.

Id. at 16.

ERESHNEE NAIDU, SYRIA JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY CENTRE, SYRIA:
DOCUMENTATION AND ITS ROLE IN MEMORIALIZATION (2013), http://syriaaccountability.org/wpcon
tent/uploads/SJAC-Documentation-Memorialization-Memo-2013_EN.pdf.
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efforts have contributed to a relatively rich pool of documentation material
to support various future justice-related efforts.
For instance, the Commission for International Justice and
Accountability (CIJA), is an international NGO that has been heavily
engaged in gathering and processing a significant pool of evidence relating
to atrocity crimes.370 In the course of its work, CIJA has gained access to
more than 700,000 pages from Syrian Government’s Intelligence and
Security agencies. 371 The purpose of CIJA is to lay the foundation for
future prosecution “along the lines of Nuremberg,” according to its
Executive Director.372
Similarly, The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) is
another entity that gathers intensive documentation in relation to atrocity
crimes in Syria.373 SJAC analyzes the materials that it receives according to
international law, with the purpose of promoting justice and accountability,
and preserving evidence in order to “advance transitional justice and peacebuilding.”374
Furthermore, the Syrian Accountability Project (SAP) is an
internationally-recognized platform that is documenting war crimes and
crimes against humanity taking place in the Syrian context.375 The project
is led by David Crane, the former Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for
Sierra Leone.376 In addition to gathering documentation, SAP analyzes the
collected materials with reference to such relevant legal frameworks as
international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and domestic
Syrian criminal law.377
These efforts, while not in and of themselves necessarily sufficient for
a comprehensive justice initiative, could provide fundamental support for
diverse accountability mechanisms in the future.
370. Mark Kersten, Event: Prospects of Justice, Avenues for Accountability – Investigating
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, JUST. IN CONFLICT (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/03/01/event-prospects-of-justice-avenues-for-accountabilityinvestigati
ng-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity-in-syria/.
371. Stephanie Nebehay, Experts Say War Crimes Case Against Assad Government Growing,
REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2017, 10:49 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriawarcrimes
/experts-say-war-crimes-case-against-assad-government-growing-idUSKBN16M24Z.
372.

Id.

373. About SJAC, SYRIA JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY CENTRE, https://syriaaccountability.org/
about/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
374.

Id.

375. The Syrian Accountability Project, SYRACUSE U. C. L., http://syrianaccountabilityproject
.syr.edu/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
376.

Id.

377.

Id.
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Regime Defectors

Defectors from the Assad regime have also contributed significantly to
the tapestry of justice mechanisms taking place in the Syrian context. The
“Caesar Photographs,” for instance, is a particularly striking documentation
and awareness effort. 378 A former Assad regime forensic photographer,
who is called by the alias “Caesar,” smuggled more than 55,000 photos of
the bodies of detainees tortured or starved to death by the Assad regime. 379
The photographs were a component of the Syrian security branch’s efforts
to develop a formal record of deaths in their detention centers; each body is
marked with an identification number. 380 The photographs have been
highly effective as awareness-raising tools and establish a poignant record
of atrocities taking place in Syrian. The photographs have already been
utilized to support justice efforts. For example, in Spain, a case was lodged
against the Syrian government for “state terrorism” on the behalf of a
Syrian-Spanish woman who recognized her brother among the photographs
of victims. 381 Although the case itself has not resulted in a clear
prosecutorial path, this step illustrates the potential utility of the
photographs—and other related documentation efforts—in supporting
future prosecutorial efforts, if and when the time is right.
These efforts to document atrocity crimes support preparation for
future prosecutions, whether by the ICC, by a future hybrid tribunal, or by
third party states under a theory of universal jurisdiction (discussed further
below). The justice-related impacts of the Caesar project have already
reverberated among policy makers, for instance prompting the United
States Senate to introduce a bill in April 2017 after the Khan Sheikhoun gas
attack by the Syrian regime.382 Among the measures included within the
bill, was the call to establish a hybrid court for Syria to prosecute Assad and
his regime.383 The bill was modeled on a previously-produced draft statute
known as the “Chautauqua Blueprint” for an extraordinary tribunal for
atrocity crimes in Syria, drawn up by chief prosecutors of several

378. Syria: Stories Behind Photos of Killed Detainees, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 16, 2015,
5:47 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/16/syria-stories-behind-photos-killed-detainees.
379.

Nebehay, supra note 371.

380. PRIYANKA MOTAPARTHY & NADIM HOURY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IF THE DEAD
COULD SPEAK: MASS DEATHS AND TORTURE IN SYRIA’S DETENTION FACILITIES (2015), https://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/syria1215web_0.pdf.
381.

Nebehay, supra note 371.

382.

Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act of 2017, S. 905, 115th Cong. (2017).
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international criminal tribunals under the initiative of the Public
International Law & Policy Group.384
6.

Universal Jurisdiction

Perhaps the most creative of current efforts to pursue accountability in
Syria is the steadily growing list of countries that are attempting to use
universal jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for atrocities. 385
Universal jurisdiction is the legal construct, which provides that any
national court in any country can prosecute any individual from any country
for the gravest of international law crimes, including “crimes against
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and torture.” 386 Although specific
procedures vary, typically the prosecuting state needs the defendant to be
within its territory before its domestic courts have the power to arrest and
try that person. 387 Prosecuting universal jurisdiction cases poses several
steep logistical obstacles, such as gathering evidence and compelling
appearances, which have rendered it an inefficient or otherwise morally
questionable practice, even if it is occasionally an effective means of
pursuing justice.388
In the Syrian context, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, and
Spain have had moderate successes with prosecuting certain individuals
from the Assad regime’s security forces, but have been unable to detain or
convict higher-level officials or military officers.389 In the Spanish context,
a case was filed against nine high-ranking security officers of the Assad
regime, but the case was dismissed before it could go to trial due to
domestic interpretation of the Spanish court’s jurisdiction. 390 In the
384. The Chautauqua Blueprint for A Statute for A Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute
Atrocity Crimes, SYRACUSE U.: INST. FOR NAT’L SECURITY & COUNTERTERRORISM, http://insct.syr.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Chautauqua-Blueprint1.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
385. Noha Aboueldahab, The Perils of Impulsive Promises for Justice in Syria, BROOKINGS
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/04/24/the-perils-of-impulsive-promisesfor-justice-in-syria/.
386.

Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 126.

387.

Id.

388. Hussein Ibish, Universal Jurisdiction Raises as Many Problems as It Solves, NATIONAL
(Sept. 28, 2013), https://www.thenational.ae/universal-jurisdiction-raises-as-many-problems-as-itsolves1.277149. In the post-WWII era when the concept was relatively new, Israeli Mossad Special Forces
abducted Adolf Eichmann from Argentina for trial and eventual execution for war crimes and atrocity
crimes. See id.
389. Aboueldahab, supra note 385 (noting Spain’s investigation into Assad-sponsored state
terrorism in 2013); Reinl, supra note 360 (noting Sweden’s successful sentencing of a former Syrian
opposition fighter to life in prison in Sweden for war crimes).
390. Adam Entous, A Photo of Her Brother’s Corpse Popped Up on Her Phone. Now Syrian
Officials Could be Put on Trial for War Crimes., WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.
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Swedish context, meanwhile, a successful prosecution was completed,
although the individual in question was a relatively low-level Syrian
perpetrator and the evidence was sufficient to convict only for violating
human dignity, as opposed to a crime attached to more serious
punishment.391 In Germany, criminal complaints have been filed against
high-level members of the Assad regime, under a theory of universal
jurisdiction.392 The outcome of these complaints remains to be seen. In
general, both the evidentiary collection problem and the means to compel
suspects to appear before courts that are asserting universal jurisdiction
continue to be challenges in Syria.
7.

The International Criminal Court

Syria has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute, thus precluding the
ICC’s jurisdiction over the atrocity crimes being committed in Syria. 393
Although Syria could be referred to the ICC via U.N. Security Council
referral, as set forth above, such a referral was vetoed by Russia and China
in 2014 394 and almost certainly would be vetoed again. However,
eventually, it may be possible to make use of retroactive ICC jurisdiction.
When Assad does finally depart Syria (one way or another), the Syrian
people, and the international community could pressure the new Syrian
government to ratify the Rome Statute, and then prosecute Assad and other
high-level perpetrators implicated in the Syrian war at the ICC.395

washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/from-a-trove-of-grim-photos-a-case-against-assadsgovern
ment/2017/02/01/728575d0-e8d7-11e6-bf6f-301b6b443624_story.html?utm_term=.f1a250139819; see
also Simon Hooper, Torture Complaint Filed Against Syrian Officials in Spanish Court, NEWSDEEPLY:
SYRIA DEEPLY (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2017/02/03/torturecomplaintfiled-against-syrian-officials-in-spanish-court; Editorial, Spanish Court Drops Complaint Against Syrian
Security Forces, REUTERS (July 21, 2017, 8:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisissyria-spain/spain-court-drops-complaint-against-syrian-security-forces-idUSKBN1A61J1.
391. Anne Barnard, Syrian Soldier is Guilty of War Crime, A First in the 6-year Conflict, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/world/middleeast/syria-war-crime.html.
392. Barbara Unmüßig, Opening Speech: Towards Accountability for International Crimes in
Syria, HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.boell.de/en/2017/11/10/opening-speechtowards-accountability-international-crimes-syria.
393.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 348.

394. Rep. of the S.C., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7180 (2014); Peter Nadin, How the UN Security
Council Failed Syria, INTERPRETER (Aug. 30, 2017, 18:09), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/theinterpre
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CONCLUSION

Ultimately, there are no easy answers in regard to the Syrian crisis, or
to the fundamental puzzle of peace, justice, and the potential combination
thereof. The case of Syria illustrates an immense weight of international
crime balanced against the impossibility of immediate options for direct
accountability—balanced, on the other side, against the immense
importance of securing peace and halting hostilities. Ultimately, the last
chapter on accountability in Syria remains to be written. Although after an
initial period of certainty, the Syrian context thus far has come to reflect the
predominance of a peace-first approach. Yet, the record is clear that, if
nothing else, justice is persistent. Moreover, given the rich array of players
in the Syrian context paired with the intensity of the conflict, sustainable
peace is likely to be elusive without at least a measure of justice. The
tilting balance, however, of both how much justice, and the nature of that
justice, is unclear. It is possible that Syria will go the path of Colombia,
with a mechanism that focuses, in its essence, on the transitional elements
of justice. Alternatively, Syria may take on the Sierra Leonean model, with
prosecutions for the most high-ranking perpetrators, and alternative
mechanisms for mid-to-low-level perpetrators. Appeasement is unlikely to
win the day in Syria, and although it is likely that a “justice-first” approach
is no longer truly feasible in this challenging context, the menu of options
for weaving justice into peace remain. It is possible that, through these, the
long arm of justice will eventually reach the Syrian context.

